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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No, 1: Whether the District Court erred in its determination that Plaintiffs 
met their burden to prove all of the elements required to give rise to .1 dedication JIHJ 
abandonment of private property for a public highway under the governing statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-5-104, by competent, clear and convincing evidence. 
Standard of Review: All elements required for the dedication nn1 ,il tndonntent 
of private property for a public highway must be proven by the plaintiff by clear and 
convincing evidence. E.g., Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 379, 438 P.2d 545, 547 
(1968). The ultimate determination of whether the facts meet the sttiluloi \ definition of a 
public highway "is a mixed question of fact and law," which the appellate court reviews 
"for correctness." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997). 
Additionally, since the District Court decided this case on ^immar> judgment, the 
appellate court must "review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for correctness and 
afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95 5, 61 
P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 1 IT 
100, Tf 9, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted). 
Demonstration that Issue No. 1 Was Preserved in the District Court: The 
attorneys who represented Dixie Riding Club, Inc. ("Dixie") in the summary judgment 
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proceedings below argued, for example, in Dixie's summary judgment reply 
memorandum, that "Plaintiffs (sic) have a burden with clear and convincing evidence to 
establish, under the mandates of § 72-5-104(1), that the private property of the 
Defendant's (sic) should now be declared a public roadway. This Honorable Court 
should see that this burden cannot be met[.]" (R. 289 (Dixie's Reply)). 
Issue No. 2: Whether the District Court erred in failing to assess the reasonable 
and necessary width of any public highway, even if any public highway was properly 
found to exist (which Dixie denies). 
Standard of Review: Plain error. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3)(2005) (stating 
width of a public thoroughfare dedicated under governing statute "is that which is 
reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances"); 
Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("even if a public thoroughfare 
was created, the District Court erred in failing to assess the reasonable and necessary 
width of the roadway") (emphasis added). 
Statement of Grounds for Seeking Review on Issue No, 2: Plaintiffs failed to 
provide for the District Court any evidence at all regarding the reasonable and necessary 
width of any public highway. The District Court therefore had no basis to, could not, and 
did not conduct any assessment of the reasonable and necessary width of any public 
highway as is required by the governing Utah statute and case law. It therefore was plain 
error for the District Court to dedicate a fifty-foot wide swath of Dixie's property as a 
public highway, particularly where there was no evidence of any use of such width. 
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Issue No. 3: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in ruling that all 
facts set forth by Plaintiffs in support of their cross-motion for summary judgment were 
deemed admitted by Dixie, purportedly because Dixie did not separately list and quote 
verbatim Plaintiffs' fact claims that were disputed by Dixie, even though Dixie filed 
affidavits and memoranda opposing and disputing material facts. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., 
Inc., 2004 UT App 354, ffi[ 13-15, 101 P.3d 371, 375-76. 
Statement of Grounds for Seeking Review on Issue No. 3: This abuse of 
discretion did not become apparent uniiii aita the unniriary jun^meni briefing was 
completed and the District Court issued its ruling based upon and chiding Dixie's then 
attorneys for this issue. Since Dixie's memoranda discussed and was supported by facts 
set forth by affidavit, the District Cnurf s abandonment of Dixie's property as a public 
highway was an abuse of discretion, and is appropriate for this Court's review. 
:
"' Issue No. 4: Whether the District Court improperly engaged in a weighing of • 
disputed facts and evidence on summary judgment. 
Standard of Review: "Summary judgment is proper only when 'there is no 
'genuine issue as to any material fact and the mo\ ing party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.' Utah R, Civ. P. 56(c). 'In determining whether the lower court correctly 
found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts and inferences to 
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party,' In other words, 'we 
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review the factual submissions to the District Court in a light most favorable to finding a 
material issue of fact.' Moreover, c[i]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 
accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review them for 
correctness.'" Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations 
omitted). 
Demonstration that Issue No. 4 Was Preserved in the District Court: Dixie 
submitted to the District Court affidavits disputing the claimed facts set forth by Plaintiffs 
in support of their motion, and argued those disputed facts in opposition to Plaintiffs' 
motion. The District Court's statement in its ruling drawing a contrast between the 
parties' respective summary judgment materials and noting that Plaintiffs' materials 
struck the court as "clearly more detailed and analytical," (R. 309, Ruling n.l), shows an 
improper weighing of evidence on summary judgment appropriate for this Court to 
review. This abuse of discretion did not become apparent until after the summary 
judgment briefing was completed and the District Court issued its ruling. 
Issue No. 5: Whether the District Court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs have 
standing to maintain this action, misstating the standing argument as whether private 
citizens may rely upon Utah Code § 72-5-104, where the standing issue actually pertains 
to whether the claimed evidence of use that was presented to the District Court was use 
by the "public" sufficient under the statute, or merely use by private parties and 
neighboring property owners that as a matter of law cannot create a public highway 
dedication. 
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Standard of Review: "We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for 
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 
UT 9b 1| 5, 6: P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v Outdoor Endeavors 
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, ^  9, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted). 
Demonstration that Issue No. 5 Was Preserved in the District Court: Dixie's 
attorneys below argued, for example, in Dixie's opening summary judgment 
memorandum, that "[t]he first issue is that the Plaintiffs (sic), each and every one of 
them, or (sic) in fact individuals, and are not members of any body politic entitled to 
pursue a dedicated road on behalf of the City of St. George" (R. 130); "private persons 
are seeking to deprive the Plaintiffs (sic) of theit property willi no slanding In do so" 
(R. 135); and "Plaintiffs (sic) by seeking to have property dedicated, paid for, and taxes 
having been rendered, declared a public thoroughfare, these Plaintiffs (sic) are, in 
essence, claiming to privately act on behalf of the public* i ing no standing i<> j mrsue 
the rights of the City of St. George." (R. 135-36). 
Issue No. b: Whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred for failuir fi i n.nne llic < \V\ nt 
St. George as a necessary and indispensable party, where the evidence presented to the 
District Court by Plaintiffs (which Dixie does not admit) claiming the disputed alleged 
roadway at issue may have been either owned by oi subject ( in easement in Li\< i ul 1 lie 
city of St. George. The effect of Plaintiffs' claims in this case and the District Court's 
Decree of Dedication were to declare property and property rights purportedly owned by 
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the city of St. George to have been abandoned to the state, without Plaintiffs naming St. 
George as a party to this case. 
Standard of Review: Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a 
person or entity who claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the action whose 
interests may be affected by the outcome of the case "shall" be joined as parties to the 
action. Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' entitlement to judgment as a matter 
of law to abandon property rights and interests Plaintiffs claim were owned by St. 
George, without naming St. George as a party, should be reviewed for correctness and 
afforded no deference. Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95 \ 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991. 
Demonstration that Issue No. 6 Was Preserved in the District Court: 
Plaintiffs themselves submitted evidence below claiming that the alleged roadway was 
either owned by or subject to an easement in favor of St. George. (E.g., R. 171-72 (Aff. 
of David Elwess, title searcher, *[fl[ 5 & 19 (discussing same)). Dixie objected below that 
"[t]he City of St. George is a municipal corporation that is not a party to this lawsuit," 
despite Plaintiffs' claim that the City owns land which Plaintiffs seek to have dedicated 
as a public highway. (R. 130 & 135-36). 
Additionally, a party to a lawsuit may raise the issue of failure to join an 
indispensable party at any time in the proceedings, including for the first time on appeal. 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Utah R. Civ. 
P. 19(a). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTE 
Utah Code § 72-5-104 (2005): Public use concerning dedication — Scope 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public 
when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period often years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by 
the state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, 
and 72-5-103. 
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and 
necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and 
circumstances. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This action was originally filed by Plaintiffs H. Val Hafen, Gilbert Jennings, 
Mansfield Jennings, Conrad Bowler, and Lewis Bowler (collectively referred to herein a: 
"Plaintiffs") on April 11, 2003. (R. 1-4.) The original complaint named David T. 
Welch and John Does 1 through 20 as defendants and sought a declaratory judgment thai 
a certain purported "roadway" was dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. On October 14, 2003, Plaintiffs moved to 
amend their complaint, naming Dixie Riding Club ("Dixie") as defendant, removing 
David T. Welch as defendant, adding Jennings Investment, LC as plaintiff, and adding a 
cause of action for a prescriptive easement. (R. 61-63). The amendment was allowed 
and Plaintiffs' "Second Amended Complaint" (there is no first amended complaint in the 
record) was filed on October 29, 2003. (R. 77-83). 
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Dixie moved for partial summary judgment ("Dixie's Motion") seeking dismissal 
of Plaintiffs' public highway claim on January 14, 2005. Dixie's Motion was supported 
by a memorandum of points and authorities and an Affidavit of Charles Welch. (R 127-
144). 
Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment ("Plaintiffs5 Cross-
Motion") on March 9, 2005, along with a supporting memorandum and affidavits, 
seeking an order dedicating as a public highway a portion of real property owned by 
Dixie. (R. 139-285). 
Dixie filed an Opposition to Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply 
Brief to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion ("Dixie's Reply") with a second and supplemental 
Affidavit of Charles Welch on April 28, 2005. (R. 286-292). Plaintiffs filed their final 
reply brief ("Plaintiffs Reply") on July 11, 2005, (R. 293-301), and the parties' motions 
were then submitted for decision on July 12, 2005. (R. 302-303). 
On November 10, 2005, Fifth District Court Judge G. Rand Beacham held a 
hearing on the parties' summary judgment motions. (R. 308). On January 12, 2006, 
Judge Beacham entered his Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment, denying Dixie's 
Motion and granting Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion. (R. 309-311.) On March 7, 2006, Judge 
Beacham entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 319-337) and a Decree of 
Dedication (R. 338-340), both of which were prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel. 
Dixie filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court's decision on April 5, 2006. 
(R. 377-378). Dixie's appeal ultimately was assigned to this Court. 
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II. Statement of Facts 
a. Background Facts 
1. Dixie owns certain real property in Washington County, Utah (the "Dixie 
Property"), upon which is located an equestrian arena that historically has been used for 
rodeos and similar events. (R. 19 (Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ffl[ 3 & 4); 
R. 83 (Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint)). 
2. Plaintiffs claim that a purported "roadway" crosses the Dixie Property (the 
"Alleged Roadway"), and that Plaintiffs and the general public have an interest in the 
Alleged Roadway as a public highway or public thoroughfare. (R. 78-79 (Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint ffi[ 1 & 2)). 
b. Facts Relating to Ownership of the Alleged Roadway. 
3. Plaintiffs allege that the Washington County Assessor recognized some 
portion of the Alleged Roadway as a "public road," and that the Alleged Roadway had 
not been carried under the Washington County tax rolls. (R. 80 (Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint at If 8). 
4. In the summary judgment proceedings below, Plaintiffs submitted the 
affidavit of David Elwess, a title searcher for Plaintiffs, which stated that "it appears that 
[the Alleged Roadway] was specifically omitted from the legal description of property 
subject to tax or assessment by Washington County." (R. 171-72 (Aff. of David Elwess 
119)). 
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5. The Elwess affidavit further stated that "[i]n about 1972 or 1973, [Dixie] 
started deeding out separate parcels from the overall parent parcel." (R. 167 (Aff. of 
David Elwess f 5)). 
6. In Plaintiffs' initial memorandum filed in support of their Cross-Motion for 
partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs stated that "[o]n May 30, 1974, [Dixie] deeded a 
four foot easement to the City of St. George which was added to an existing 46 foot right-
of-way easement the City held, making a total 50 foot easement. The May 30, 1974 
warranty deed specifically refers to the [Alleged Roadway] and states that: '[t]he 
following described property to be added to and be part of an existing roadway to be used 
by the grantee as and for a public roadway and easement for utilities.'" (R. 149 
(Statement of Facts at Tf 18 (a))). 
7. In Plaintiffs' memorandum in support of their Cross-Motion for partial 
summary judgment, Plaintiffs stated that "the [Alleged Roadway] connects between 1100 
West and 1230 North, and has been in existence since about 1972 as [Dixie] deeded out 
lots of the larger arena parcel." (R. 160 (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 22)). 
8. By contrast, on behalf of Dixie, Charles Welch testified by affidavit that the 
land of the Alleged Roadway was included in the legal description in the conveyance 
deed to Dixie, and that Dixie has paid all taxes on the Alleged Roadway property. 
(R. 139 (Aff. of Charles Welch ffi[ 4-5.) 
9. Arthur L. Partridge, the Washington County Assessor, in an April 15, 2004 
letter to Dixie, wrote that "[a]fter a recent survey of two properties owned by Dixie 
Riding Club, Inc., it was brought to the attention of the Washington County Assessor's 
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office and the Washington County Recorders offices, that the acreage had been 
understated for many years." Mr. Partridge also wrote that the understatement of acreage 
had been corrected and that Dixie has never been delinquent in its payment of property 
taxes. (R. 142 (Exhibit 1 to Aff. of Charles Welch)). 
10. Charles Welch testified by affidavit that Dixie had had discussions with the 
City of St. George about making the Alleged Roadway a dedicated road, and that neither 
the City of St. George nor Dixie decided to make the Alleged Roadway a dedicated road. 
(R. 139 (Aff. of Charles Welch ffij 6-7)). 
c. Facts Relating to the Use of the Alleged Roadway. 
i. Evidence of Use Only by Neighboring Landowners 
11. In support of their Cross-Motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs 
filed six affidavits discussing claimed use of the Alleged Roadway purportedly by 
members of the general public. (R. 231-250, 271-285 (Affs. of Conrad Bowler, Ethan 
Bundy, H. Val Hafen, Gilbert Jennings, Mansfield Jennings, and Lewis Bowler)). 
12. Five of those six affiants (Conrad Bowler, H. Val Hafen, Gilbert Jennings, 
Mansfield Jennings, and Lewis Bowler), however, are named Plaintiffs in this action and 
whom the evidence showed owned real property immediately abutting the Alleged 
Roadway. (R. 231-236, 243-250, 271-285 (Affs. of Conrad Bowler, H. Val Hafen, 
Gilbert Jennings, Mansfield Jennings, and Lewis Bowler); see also R. 139 (Aff. of 
Charles Welch 13)). 
13. The sixth of those affiants (Ethan Bundy) is not a party to this case, but was 
an owner of property abutting the Alleged Roadway until August 2000, including during 
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the time Plaintiffs claim the Alleged Roadway was created. (R. 239 (Aff. of Ethan 
Bundy1f2)). 
14. All six of those affidavits primarily discussed use of the Alleged Roadway 
merely by neighboring landowners, including the affiants themselves, rather than by 
members of the general public, including: 
(a.) Plaintiff Conrad Bowler's affidavit discussed claimed use by 
property owners in the Ence Bowler Marsh Subdivision, which he developed, 
located immediately to the west of the Alleged Roadway, to ride their horses from 
one part of the neighborhood to another part of the neighborhood, and sometimes 
to head toward Snow Canyon. (R. 232 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler ffij 2 & 5)); 
(b.) Other affiants also discussed use of the Alleged Roadway merely to 
get from one part of the adjacent neighborhood to another. (R. 233 (Aff. of 
Conrad Bowler ^ 6)); R. 240 (Aff. of Ethan Bundy % 5); R. 244 (Aff. of H. Val 
Hafen ffi[ 4 & 5); R. 273-74 (Aff. of Gilbert Jennings ffif 5 & 9); R. 279 (Aff. of 
Mansfield Jennings ffif 5 & 8). 
15. The evidence presented by Dixie, however, was that Dixie allowed adjacent 
land owners to use the Alleged Roadway from time to time with Dixie's express or 
implied permission. (Aff. of Charles Welch ^ 9)). 
ii. Evidence of Use by Persons other than Neighboring Landowners 
16. The six affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs discussing use of the Alleged 
Roadway set forth only the following relating to the claimed use of the Alleged Roadway 
purportedly or possibly by persons other than neighboring landowners: 
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(a.) On the north end of the Alleged Roadway was a trail head where 
"many people" used to ride out in the country. (R. 233 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler 
If 5)); R. 239 (Aff. of Ethan Bundy H 4); R. 272 (Aff. of Gilbert Jennings ] 4); 
R. 278 (Aff. of Mansfield Jennings U 4). 
(b.) Instead of riding their horses on the nearby paved 1100 West road, 
"people" used the Alleged Roadway to ride to the north and around an old turkey 
farm that was about a mile away. (R. 233 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler ^ 5)); R. 239 
(Aff. of Ethan Bundy ^ 4); R. 273 (Aff. of Gilbert Jennings 1J 4); R. 279 (Aff. of 
Mansfield Jennings f 4).. 
(c.) The Alleged Roadway was traveled by the "public in general" from 
about 1972 until 2002, approximately when the gate was put up by Dixie. (R. 233 
(Aff. of Conrad Bowler ^ 6)); R. 240 (Aff. of Ethan Bundy f 5) (until 2000); 
R. 244-45 (Aff. of H. Val Hafen fflf 4 & 5); R. 273 (Aff. of Gilbert Jennings f 5); 
R. 279 (Aff. of Mansfield Jennings 1f 5). 
(d.) The "general public" drove on the Alleged Roadway to look at 
horses stabled along the Alleged Roadway, to take horses to be bred or stabled, to 
discuss business regarding their horses, and to buy horses and sell horses. (R. 234-
35 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler ffi[ 7 & 11); R. 240-41 (Aff. of Ethan Bundy ffl[ 8 
& 10); R. 245 (Aff. of H. Val Hafen 16); R. 274 (Aff. of Gilbert Jennings U 9); 
(e.) The "general public" used the Alleged Roadway to watch people use 
the sheriffs arena on the Dixie Property. (R. 234 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler f 7) 
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R. 240-41 (Aff. of Ethan Bundy 1[ 10); R. 245 (Aff. of H. Val Hafen ^ 6); R. 274 
(Aff. of Gilbert Jennings ] 8); 
(f.) The "general public" used the Alleged Roadway "almost daily," 
even when no public event took place at the arena. (R. 234 (Aff. of Conrad Bowler 
18); 
(g.) The "general public" accessed a tack and saddle shop just south of 
the arena via the Alleged Roadway. (R. 235 Aff. of Conrad Bowler ^ 10); R. 241 
(Aff. of Ethan Bundy ] 9); R. 245 (Aff. of H. Val Hafen ] 6); 
(h.) The Alleged Roadway was used "by the public as a thoroughfare." 
R. 246 (Aff. of H. Val Hafen U 68). 
17. Charles Welch testified in his affidavit on behalf of Dixie that Dixie has 
never allowed the general public to use the property as a thoroughfare, a roadway, a 
right-of-way, or any other use except if by implied or express permission. (R. 140 (Aff. 
ofCharles Welch H 10)). 
18. In its answers to Plaintiffs' requests for admissions (which Plaintiffs cited 
purportedly in support of their Cross-Motion), Dixie also stated that "any and all access 
to the property in question was, in fact, done with the implied or express permission of 
the general leadership, or membership of the Dixie Riding Club, Inc." (R. 256 (Answer 
to Plaintiffs First Request for Admission No. 14)). 
19. A photograph of the Alleged Roadway taken in January 2005 shows the 
approach to the Alleged Roadway, which Plaintiffs claim is a part of the Alleged 
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Roadway, is a narrow pathway through large overgrown bushes. (R. 143 (Exhibit 2 to 
Aff. of Charles Welch)). 
d. The District Court's Findings and Rulings. 
20. The District Court ruled that Dixie's legal counsel below did not properly 
object to and dispute the facts as claimed by Plaintiffs because he did not separately state 
and quote each fact claimed by Plaintiff and follow each quoted fact with a discussion of 
the evidence disputing each such claimed fact. The District Court therefore ruled that all 
claimed facts set forth by Plaintiffs were deemed as admitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(c)(3)(B). The District Court therefore ruled that the Alleged Roadway "was 
'continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of [far more than] ten years,5 as 
is required to establish dedication and abandonment to the use of the public pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104," (R. 310 (Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment) 
(alteration in original). A copy of the Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment is 
attached hereto as Addendum No. 1. Based on that ruling, the District Court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and also a Decree of Dedication, both of which 
were drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel, declaring a 50-foot wide swath of the Dixie Property 
to be dedicated and abandoned as a public highway. (R. 319-37 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law); R. 338-40 (Decree of Dedication). Copies of the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and of the Decree of Dedication are attached hereto as 
Addenda 2 & 3, respectively.). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in declaring a portion of the Dixie Property dedicated and 
abandoned as a public highway on Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs failed their burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the 
elements required for dedication of private property as a public highway, particularly on 
summary judgment where there were disputed facts on required elements of Plaintiffs' 
claim as to whether any claimed use shown to the court was use by the public and 
whether it was by permission. The District Court also abused its discretion in declaring 
Plaintiffs' claimed facts as admitted by Dixie where they were actually disputed by sworn 
affidavit. 
Even if Plaintiffs had met their burden of proof (which Dixie denies), and even if 
there were not disputes of material fact precluding summary judgment for Plaintiffs in 
any event (which there were), the District Court still erred in granting Plaintiffs' Cross-
Motion in this case because it failed to receive any evidence regarding, or to make any 
analysis or evaluation of, the reasonable and necessary width and use of the Alleged 
Roadway, which is required under the governing statute and dispositive case law. 
Declaration of a public highway in any event also was in error because the 
evidence presented by Plaintiffs themselves showed that the City of St. George either 
owned or had an easement to the Alleged Roadway. The City of St. George is therefore a 
necessary and indispensable party to this case that concerns the parties' respective rights 
to that property which Plaintiffs themselves claim the City may own. Plaintiffs, however, 
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failed to join the City as a party to this case so that it could assert and protect its rights in 
and to that property. 
The District Court improperly rushed to summary judgment on this case. Its 
decision is erroneous and indeed contrary to established rules of law and procedure in 
several different regards. This Court therefore should reverse the District Court, and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT 
PLAINTIFFS MET THEIR BURDEN TO PROVE, BY UNDISPUTED, 
COMPETENT, CLEAR, AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, ALL OF THE 
ELEMENTS REQUIRED UNDER THE GOVERNING STATUTE TO 
GIVE RISE TO A DEDICATION AND ABANDONMENT OF DIXIE'S 
PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR A PUBLIC HIGHWAY 
A. Plaintiffs Failed Their Burden of Proof. 
Plaintiffs were required, but failed, to prove by clear and convincing evidence all 
elements required for the existence of a public highway. The ultimate determination of 
whether the facts meet the statutory definition of a public highway "is a mixed question 
of fact and law," which the appellate court reviews "for correctness." Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997). 
In order to establish dedication for public use, the person seeking dedication must 
demonstrate each of the following: (1) continuous use, (2) as a public thoroughfare, and 
(3) for a period often years. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (emphasis added). The "public 
4814-2584-0129 17 
thoroughfare" element consists of and requires proof of all the following: (i) passing or 
travel, (ii) by the public, (iii) without permission. Heber City, 942 P.2d at 311 (stating 
above elements, including that "use by permission does not constitute use as a public 
thoroughfare") (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916) (emphasis 
added). Plaintiffs' public highway claim fails, and the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment for Plaintiffs, because Plaintiffs did not prove use by the public and 
without permission. 
The Utah Supreme Court has admonished that "the dedication of one's property to 
a public use should not be regarded lightly." Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 648 
(Utah 1966). Accordingly, that Court has held repeatedly that "[t]he presumption is in 
favor of the property owner" and against a dedication, id., and all of the above-referenced 
required elements for dedication of private property as a public highway must therefore 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
The ultimate question in public dedication cases like this one is: 
Was there sufficient evidence by competent testimony, by witnesses 
who were not self-serving, to show by clear and convincing evidence, 
that the public generally, — not just a few having their own special and 
private interests in the road, had used the road continuously for 10 
years? [Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545, 546-47 
(Utah 1968) (emphasis added)]. 
The District Court's dedication of the Alleged Roadway to the public in this case, 
based solely on Plaintiffs' handful of self-serving affidavits by neighboring property 
owners including some of the Plaintiffs themselves, reveals a misapprehension of the 
sanctity and respect which should be afforded to the ownership of property in Utah. 
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For at least ninety years, Utah courts addressing the issue of public dedication by 
use have consistently distinguished between use of a road by the general public, and use 
by owners of adjoining property. "Such [adjoining] property owners cannot be 
considered members of the public generally, as that term generally is used in dedication 
by user statutes." Petersen, 438 P.2d at 546. Plaintiffs' affidavits submitted in this case, 
however, establish at most only that neighboring landowners and their guests may have 
used the Alleged Roadway to get from one part of the neighborhood to the next, to visit 
one of the businesses located on property adjacent to the Alleged Roadway, or to observe 
others using the equestrian arena on the Dixie Property.1 Such private uses of Dixie's 
land, however, are insufficient as a matter of law to establish, and do not establish, 
dedication to the public under Utah Code § 72-5-104. See e.g., Pitts v. Roberts, 562 P.2d 
231, 232 (Utah 1971) (holding evidence insufficient to establish public use element under 
public highway statute where only evidence presented was use by abutting land owners); 
Thompson v. Nelson, 273 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1954) (emphasis that "use must be by the 
public" in order to meet the public highway statute) (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 161 
P. 1127, 1131(Utah 1916); See also Renfro v. McCowan, 2006 WL 3254509 at *4 
1
 See e.g., R. 232-35 (Affidavit of Conrad Bowler) ("Property owners who owned horses 
west and south of the arena frequently rode their horses through the [Alleged Roadway]," 
"The people having horses in the [adjacent] Ence Bowler Marsh Subdivision also road 
(sic) their horses north through the [Alleged Roadway], and headed towards Snow 
Canyon," "In addition, people frequently walked through the [Alleged Roadway] or 
drove cars to get from one part of the neighborhood to the next," "numerous people used 
both 1100 West and the [Alleged Roadway] to get to the [neighboring] Ence feed mill."). 
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(D. Utah 2006) (noting that under Utah's public highway statute "the 'public' includes 
those normally recognized as being the public, with the exception of owners of adjoining 
property and those using the road by permission."). Thus, section 72-5-104's "use as a 
public thoroughfare" requirement cannot be satisfied by any amount of use by the owners 
of adjoining property. 
Nor does any amount of use, even if it is by the public, give rise to a public 
thoroughfare if such use is by permission. See e.g., Heber City, 942 P.2d at 311. "[U]se 
by permission does not constitute use as a public thoroughfare." Id. (quotation omitted). 
These well-established rules of law requiring use by the public generally and not 
by permission in order to establish a public thoroughfare precluded summary judgment in 
this case for at least three reasons. First, it is undisputed that all of Plaintiffs' affiants 
were direct or indirect current or former owners of property abutting the Alleged 
Roadway. Thus, any use by them as a matter of law is not use by the general public and 
therefore cannot give rise to a public thoroughfare. Second, both in the affidavits it 
submitted in opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion, and in its responses to Plaintiffs' 
discovery requests (which were cited by Plaintiffs), Dixie stated that any and all access to 
the Alleged Roadway was in fact with and by Dixie's express or implied permission. 
Such permissive use as a matter of law cannot give rise to a public thoroughfare. Third, 
in light of Dixie's affidavits and cited discovery responses there were in this case, and 
are, issues and disputes of material fact as to whether people using the Alleged Roadway 
were members of the general public whose use could ripen into a public highway or 
whether they were merely neighboring landowners whose use could not ripen into any 
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public highway, and as to whether use of the Alleged Roadway by anybody was 
permissive and therefore not supportive at all of any public highway. Where there is any 
dispute of material fact, summary judgment may not be granted. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). 
The landmark case of Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah 
1968) is highly instructive to this one. In Petersen, the plaintiffs seeking to prove 
dedication of a roadway as a public thoroughfare called numerous witnesses at trial, most 
of whom were either property owners abutting or straddling the road in question. Many 
of these witnesses were direct or indirect successors in title from a homesteader who had 
settled the area. Based on these facts, the court concluded that these witnesses 
were not a part of the general public, but were interested persons entitled 
individually to use the road personally in virtue of their documentary title, 
and they or their personal visitors cannot be numbered in the class of 
members of the general public using such road in a fashion that might 
ripen into a dedication of a road under the statute." Petersen, 20 Utah 2d 
at 379,438 P.2d at 547. 
Likewise, in the case at bar Plaintiffs failed to prove use by the public generally. 
Plaintiffs provided six affidavits regarding claimed use of the Alleged Roadway. None of 
those affiants, however, were disinterested members of the general public. Each of them 
admitted that they own, had recently owned, or were members of a limited liability 
company (Plaintiff Jennings Investment, LC) which owns, property adjacent to the 
Alleged Roadway. Each of them also discussed use primarily by neighboring property 
owners as discussed more fully above. The only evidence Plaintiffs presented of use of 
the Alleged Roadway by persons other than neighboring landowners is a set of self-
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serving and impermissibly conclusory statements, without foundation, by Plaintiffs' 
affiants to the effect that the "general public" used the Alleged Roadway. Not one 
member of the "general public" is identified. Nor do Plaintiffs indicate how many 
members of the "general public" used the Alleged Roadway, or how often. Not one 
member of the "general public" provided an affidavit describing his or her use of the 
Alleged Roadway. In short, there is nothing in Plaintiffs' affidavits that establishes at 
all, and certainly not by the required quantum of "clear and convincing evidence," that 
the persons who purportedly used the Alleged Roadway were not other neighboring 
landowners or otherwise were not using the Alleged Roadway with Dixie's permission. 
Since no disinterested party provided testimony regarding use of the road by the general 
public, and the evidence provided by Plaintiffs' affiants to the effect that the "general 
public" used the Alleged Roadway is, at best, vague, conclusory and without foundation, 
the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' affidavits simply do not and cannot constitute the required 
"clear and convincing evidence" of use "as a public thoroughfare." See Petersen, 438 
P.2d at 547 ("we believe the testimony of plaintiffs' own witnesses defeated the 
plaintiffs' cause on the simple principle that the testimony of one's own witnesses is no 
stronger than its weakest link"). It therefore was plain error for the District Court in this 
case to hold that the use alleged by Plaintiffs established use by the general public "as a 
2
 Indeed, Plaintiffs' affidavits are inadmissibly vague, conclusory, and without 
foundation, and therefore should not have been relied upon at all in the summary 
judgment proceedings. See e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
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public thoroughfare" by clear and convincing evidence, particularly on summary 
judgment in light of the disputes of material facts. 
B. Even if Plaintiffs Had Met Their Prima Facie Burden of Proof, 
Disputes of Fact Precluded Summary Judgment for Plaintiffs 
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment for Plaintiffs where there 
were disputes of material fact. Summary judgment can be granted only if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P.; Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 
1982) ("a motion for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a 
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving party would 
entitle him to judgment as a matter of law."). 
It is well-settled that "'[o]ne sworn statement under oath [involving a material 
fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary 
judgment.'" Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) (alteration in 
original). In proceedings on a motion for summary judgment, all facts and inferences 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. E.g., Drysdale v. 
3
 The District Court misstated Dixie's standing argument as whether private citizens 
may ever bring suit under Utah Code § 72-5-104. The standing issue articulated by Dixie 
below actually pertains to whether the claimed evidence of use that was presented to the 
District Court was use by the "public" sufficient under the statute, or use by private 
parties and neighboring property owners that legally cannot create a public highway. As 
shown above, the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs despite the 
fact that the affidavits they filed in support of their Cross-Motion for summary judgment 
were all made by current or former neighboring landowners, and which failed to establish 
by clear and convincing evidence that the Alleged Roadway was used "as a public 
thoroughfare," was error. 
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Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). Also, all facts asserted by Dixie in 
opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for summary judgment were required to be taken 
as established for the purposes of these proceedings. E.g., Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 
1332, 1334-35 (Utah 1977). 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals views "the facts 
in a light most favorable to the losing party below." Johnson v. Utah Dept. of Trans., 
2004 UT 284 ^ 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (quotation omitted). "Because the question of 
whether summary judgment is appropriate is a question of law," the Court of Appeals 
"accord[s] no deference to the trial court." Id. (quotation omitted). 
Here, the District Court impermissibly granted summary judgment for Plaintiff 
over and despite the presence of genuine disputes of material fact raised by Dixie. In 
particular, the District Court determined that the claimed use being made of the Alleged 
Roadway was not permissive, despite sworn testimony from Dixie that it was. The court 
further declared that the claimed use was by members of the general public, where that 
claim was also disputed. 
Public highway dedication cases are inherently fact intensive, and not prone to 
resolution on summary judgment, particularly in light of plaintiffs' burden to prove all 
required elements by "clear and convincing evidence." Indeed, amid the seventeen 
reported Utah appellate opinions that have reviewed a district court's grant of a claim for 
dedication of a roadway to the public under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 and its 
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predecessors, only one (Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995)) involved 
such a dedication granted on summary judgment and without a trial.4 
In the one reported Utah case that involved a public highway dedication granted 
on summary judgment, the Utah Supreme Court reversed because there were issues of 
disputed material facts. Id. at 1099. Specifically, it was disputed that users of the road in 
question were members of the general public and using the road without permission: 
The main thrust of the affidavits filed by defendants is that people using the 
road as described in the court's findings of fact prior to about 1960 did so 
with the permission of the landowners over whose property the road 
coursed. For example, the people using the road during the 1920s and the 
1930s to extract silica from a pit, to gather firewood, and to transport and 
graze cattle and sheep were either owners of land adjacent to the road, their 
employees, or people to whom permission had been given by the 
landowners. 
* * * 
4
 Those Utah appellate court opinions reviewing a district court's grant of a claim for 
dedication of a public roadway after a trial are: Whittaker v. Ferguson, 51 P. 980 (Utah 
1898); Schettler v. Lynch, 64 P. 955 (Utah 1901); Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. 
Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1929); Jeremy v. Bertagnole 116 P.2d 420 (Utah 1941); 
Bonner v. Sudbury, All P.2d 646 (Utah 1966); Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah 
1968); Blonquistv. Blonquist, 516 P.2d 343 (Utah 1973); Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 
447 (Utah 1981); Memmottv. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982); Butler, Crockett, and 
Walsh Development Corps, v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 
1995); Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1996); Chapman v. Uintah County, 
2003 UT App. 383, 81 P.3d 761; AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 112 P.3d 1228 (Utah App. 
2005); Utah v. Six Mile Ranch, 2006 UT App. 104, 132 P.3d 687; Utah County v. Butler, 
2006 UT App. 444, P.3d ; Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473, 
P.3d . The United States District Court for the District of Utah recently held that a 
road was "abandoned and dedicated to the use of the public" under Utah Code § 72-5-104 
on summary judgment. Renfro v. McCowan, 2006 WL 3254509 (D. Utah 2006). That 
case is clearly distinguishable from this one, however, since in Renfro the defendant 
conceded that the general public used the road without permission, see id. at *5, whereas 
use by the public and use by permission both are contested issues in this case. 
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Thus, we find that there is a material issue of fact as to whether people 
using the road prior to 1960 were members of the general public whose use 
could ripen into a public way or whether they were landowners in the area 
who had either a private right to use the road or permission of the owners 
over whose land the road coursed. [Id. at 1099-1100 (emphasis added)]. 
In reversing the district court's grant of a public highway by summary judgment, 
the Supreme Court noted that "[f]act-sensitive cases such as this case do not lend 
themselves to a determination on summary judgment." A/, at 1101. 
The same disputed issues of fact the Supreme Court identified in Bernardo as 
precluding summary judgment also exist in the case at bar. The District Court's findings 
and conclusions that use of the Alleged Roadway was not by permission are directly 
contrary to the facts stated in the affidavit of Charles Welch and Dixie's responses to 
Plaintiffs' discovery requests that were cited in the summary judgment proceedings. 
Since "[o]ne sworn statement under oath [involving a material fact] is all that is necessary 
to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary judgment," Nyman, 966 P.2d at 
1213, and particularly since facts asserted by Dixie in opposition to Plaintiffs' summary 
judgment motion were required to be taken as true, and all facts and inferences were 
required to be viewed in the light most favorable to Dixie against Plaintiffs' motion, 
Durham, 571 P.2d at 1334-35, Drysdale, 947 P.2d at 680, summary judgment in this case 
was improper. There were and are disputes of the material facts as to whether the 
claimed use of the Alleged Roadway was by the general public, and even if so, whether it 
was by permission. Both of those material facts go to whether Plaintiffs established use 
"as a public thoroughfare," a required element of their case, within the meaning of Utah 
Code § 72-5-104. Since that required element was disputed factually, the District Court's 
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grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs must be reversed and this case remanded for 
trial. 
C. The District Court Improperly Engaged In A Weighing Of Disputed 
Facts and Evidence On Summary Judgment 
As shown above, there were, and are, disputes of material facts on required 
elements of Plaintiffs' claim. By ruling as it did that the Alleged Roadway was used by 
the general public, without permission, as a public thoroughfare, the District Court 
necessarily weighed the disputed and contradictory facts and evidence on those points. 
Indeed, it acknowledged as much in its Ruling, drawing a contrast between the parties' 
respective materials and noting that Plaintiffs' materials struck the court as "clearly more 
detailed and analytical." (R. 309, Ruling n.l). It is well-established, however, that: "It is 
inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a summary 
judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). "It matters not that the evidence on one side may 
appear to be strong or even compelling." Id. (citations omitted). "'One sworn statement 
under oath [involving a material fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, 
thereby precluding summary judgment.'" Nyman, 966 P.2d at 1213. In light of the 
disputed evidence before the District Court, and the District Court's impermissible 
weighing of that evidence, summary judgment for Plaintiffs was improper and must be 
reversed. 
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D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Dedicating Dixie's 
Property To The Public Because Of Dixie's Prior Counsel's Failure To 
Strictly Comply With The Technical Requirements Of Rule 7 For 
Statements Of Fact 
The District Court decided to deem as admitted all of the claimed facts set forth by 
Plaintiffs in support of Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion because they were not specifically 
controverted by Dixie's prior counsel in numbered paragraphs that quoted verbatim the 
claimed facts submitted by Plaintiffs and separately articulated disputing facts specific to 
each paragraph. (R. 310 (Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment); R. 320 (Findings 
of Fact HI)). 
The Utah appellate courts have repeatedly grappled with balancing the need for 
efficient judicial resolution of litigation and the rights of litigants who may not fully 
comply with the format requirements of the rules of civil procedure.5 The District 
Court's ruling in this case is a stark example of the elevation of form over substance, and 
an abuse of the District Court's discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that even where an "opposing 
memorandum [does] not set forth disputed facts listed in numbered sentences in a 
separate section as required by [Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, as long as] the disputed facts [are] clearly provided in the body of the 
Most of the Utah case law considering the issue of whether a district court has abused 
its discretion by requiring strict compliance with the format requirements of motions was 
decided under Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Effective 
November 1, 2003, Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was 
repealed, and its procedural content was moved to its present location in Rule 7(c)(3)(B) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Gary Porter Const v. Fox Const, Inc., 2004 
UTApp 354,1[9,n.l, 101 P.3d371 (2004). 
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memorandum with applicable record references,... failure to comply with the technical 
requirements of rule 4-501(2)(B) is harmless." Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready 
Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155, 160, n. 4 (Utah 2004); see also Gary Porter Const v. Fox Const, 
Inc., 101 P.3d 371, 375-76 n. 2 (Utah App. 2004) (examining facts set forth in the body 
of summary judgment memorandum despite noncompliance with rule 7(c)(3)). 
Here, the two Affidavits of Charles Welch filed by Dixie clearly state facts which 
dispute factual allegations set forth in Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion and affidavits. For 
example, Charles Welch's sworn affidavits discuss and state both that the Plaintiffs' 
affiants are or have been at all times relevant to this case owners of neighboring 
property, which disputes the "public" use element of Plaintiffs' claims, and that any and 
all use of the Alleged Roadway has been with Dixie's permission. (R. 138-44 & R. 290-
92).6 Mr. Welch's affidavits were referred to and discussed in the body of Dixie's 
summary judgment memoranda. (E.g., R. 129-37 & R. 286-89). 
When Mr. Welch's affidavit testimony is compared with the statements set forth in 
Plaintiffs' affidavits, Dixie successfully stated facts which directly dispute a central 
element of Plaintiffs' case - whether the use of the Alleged Roadway was "as a public 
thoroughfare" within the meaning of Utah Code § 72-5-104, which as shown above 
requires both use by the public without permission. Accordingly, under Salt Lake County 
v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., Dixie's failure to comply with the technical format 
requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) was harmless, and the District Court's decisions to deem 
6
 Due to an apparent error at the District Court, there are two pages in the record 
numbered 140 (as well as 139, 141, 142, and 143). 
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all facts set forth by Plaintiffs in support of their Cross-Motion as admitted by Dixie, was 
an abuse of the District Court's discretion, particularly in light of the principle that "the 
dedication of one's property to a public use should not be regarded lightly." Bonner v. 
Sudbury, 417 P.2d 648 (Utah 1966). This decision should be reversed and this case 
remanded for trial. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING TO 
ASSESS THE REASONABLE AND NECESSARY WIDTH OF THE 
ALLEGED ROADWAY. 
Even if a public highway were properly found to exist, which Dixie denies, the 
District Court erred in failing to assess its "reasonable and necessary" width of it. The 
public dedication statute expressly states that the scope of public highway found to exist 
is "that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel under the facts and 
circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3). Since the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that determination of the "necessary and reasonable width" of a dedicated road requires 
"the full adjudication of the relevant facts . . . unearthed at trial," such a finding is simply 
not amenable to summary judgment. Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1101, 1101 
(1995); see also Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 
909 P.2d 225,232 (Utah 1995) ("Determining what width is necessary and proper is a 
question of fact . . . [which] involves a careful balancing of 'what is reasonable and 
necessary' given the particular facts of a given case."). Particularly not in this case where 
there was no evidence whatsoever presented by Plaintiffs to show in any way what the 
reasonable and necessary width of any Alleged Roadway would be. The District Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law did not contain any findings as to the 
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reasonable and necessary width of the Alleged Roadway dedicated to the public, nor 
could it since there was no evidence presented by Plaintiffs on that material issue. 
Plaintiffs merely unilaterally and subjectively wished to have a roadway fifty feet in 
width, so they inserted that figure into the Decree of Dedication that was entered by the 
Court, without any analysis or findings whatsoever regarding whether that was the 
reasonable and necessary width. This is plain and reversible error. 
In Kohler v. Martin, this Court held that "even if a public thoroughfare was 
created, the trial court erred in failing to assess the reasonable and necessary width of the 
roadway." 916 P.2d 910, 914 (1996) (emphasis added). The trial court had held that the 
public thoroughfare extended to a certain noted width, without making a determination of 
what was "reasonable and necessary under all the facts and circumstances." Id. {quoting 
Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982)). Because the trial court had failed 
to make this determination, this Court remanded the case for the purpose of determining 
the appropriate width of the declared roadway. 
Likewise, in the case at issue here, "a careful review of the record herein contains 
no evidence concerning the reasonable and necessary width of the [Alleged Roadway.]" 
Memmott, 642 P.2d at 754. Accordingly, there was no basis for the District Court's 
dedication of a roadway to the public that is fifty feet wide. That ruling therefore was 
plain error and must be reversed and remanded. 
In determining the appropriate width of a dedicated road, the trial court must take 
into consideration the uses to which the road historically has been put, and set the width 
"according to what was reasonable and necessary, under all the facts and circumstances, 
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for the uses which were made of the road." Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 
285 P. 646, 649 (Utah 1929). Here, the primary use of the Alleged Roadway was by 
people walking and riding horses across the Dixie Property.7 Indeed, photographs 
presented to the District Court showed the Alleged Roadway overgrown by vegetation, 
and far more narrow than fifty feet. The fifty-foot wide roadway dedicated to the public 
by virtue of the District Court's Decree of Dedication is therefore far wider than is 
"reasonable or necessary" for the historical use of the Alleged Roadway. Indeed, fifty 
feet was a width unilaterally and subjectively chosen by Plaintiffs, likely because that is 
the width required by St. George City Code for development, an obvious and 
impermissible expansion of the scope of any Alleged Roadway and the historic use even 
as claimed by Plaintiffs. 
The District Court must be reversed, and this matter must be remanded to the 
District Court for discovery and a trial, including on the issue of the reasonable and 
necessary width of any Alleged Roadway in light of, and to be limited by, the historical 
use of the Alleged Roadway. 
7
 See R. 232-33 (Affidavit of Conrad Bowler) (describing use by riders on horseback and 
walkers); R. 239-40 (Affidavit of Ethan Bundy) (same); R. 244-45 (Affidavit of H. Val 
Hafen) (same); R. 272-73 (Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings) (same); R. 278-79; (Affidavit of 
Mansfield Jennings) (same); R. 283-84 (Affidavit of Lewis J. Bowler) (same). 
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III. IF THE CITY OF ST. GEORGE OWNS OR HAS EASEMENT RIGHTS TO 
THE ALLEGED ROADWAY, AS PLAINTIFFS' OWN EVIDENCE 
INDICATES, PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED FOR FAILURE TO 
NAME THE CITY OF ST. GEORGE AS A NECESSARY AND 
INDISPENSABLE PARTY. 
A person or entity who claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the 
action whose interests may be affected by the outcome of the case "shall" be joined as 
parties to the action. Utah R. Civ. P. 19 (emphasis added). Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' entitlement to judgment as a matter of 
law to abandon property rights and interests Plaintiffs claim were owned by St. George, 
but without naming St. George as a party, should be reviewed for correctness and 
afforded no deference. Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95 ^ 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991. 
The basic purpose of Rule 19 is '"to protect the interests of absent persons as well 
as those already before the court from multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial 
determinations.'" Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990). When 
faced with a Rule 19 determination, a court must first decide whether a party is 
"necessary" under Rule 19(a). Id; Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah 
App.1989). 
A party is "necessary" if 
he [or she] claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his [or her] absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his [or her] ability to protect that interest 
or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by 
reason of his [or her] claimed interest. [Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)]. 
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Plaintiffs' own evidence shows that the city of St. George is a "necessary" party. 
To begin with, it is undisputed that the Alleged Roadway is located within the city limits 
of the City of St. George. Plaintiffs then presented evidence through the affidavit of title 
searcher David Elwess that the City has had an easement to a 46-foot wide portion of the 
Alleged Roadway since at least 1974, and that Dixie had granted an additional four-foot 
easement to the City which was added to that allegedly pre-existing 46-foot wide strip. 
Plaintiffs also presented evidence through the Elwess affidavit to the effect that the 
Alleged Roadway property was not on the tax rolls of Washington County, presumably to 
o 
show the Alleged Roadway was already owned by the City as a public road. If any of 
that evidence is correct (which Dixie does not admit), then the City's interest in the 
property that is the subject of this case makes the City a necessary party to this case, 
because the resolution of this litigation in favor of either Plaintiffs or in favor of Dixie is 
likely to impair or impede the City's ability to protect its alleged interests. That also 
could leave Plaintiffs and Dixie subject to a risk of incurring inconsistent obligations by 
reason of the City's claimed interests. 
"[U]nder the language of [Rule 19(a)], if the [absent] party is necessary and 
joinder is feasible, then joinder is mandatory." Landes, 795 P.2d at 1131. Joinder of the 
City of St. George as a party to this case therefore is mandatory. 
8
 Dixie disputed those claimed facts, submitting the Affidavit of Charles Welch stating 
the Alleged Roadway property was included in the deed to Dixie, that Dixie had at all 
times continued to own and pay the taxes on that property, and that the City had 
previously refused to dedicate that property as a public road. (R, 139). This additional 
dispute of facts further precluded summary judgment for Plaintiffs in addition to the 
disputes of fact discussed above. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The District Court therefore 
should be reversed for this additional reason. 
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Plaintiffs' claim fails, and the District Court erred, for not joining St. George as a 
necessary and indispensable party to this case. A district court's failure to follow the two-
step analysis under Rule 19 constitutes reversible error. Seftel, 767 P.2d at 945; see also 
Landes, 795 P.2d at 1130 (court erred by failing to discuss specific facts and reasoning 
leading to conclusion whether that party is necessary or indispensable under Rule 19). 
The District Court never conducted the analysis required by Rule 19 and binding caselaw 
construing it. Accordingly, the Court's dedication of the Alleged Roadway to the public 
should be reversed, and this case should be remanded for joinder of St. George as a 
necessary and indispensable party, and for discovery and trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For each of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District Court should be 
reversed and this case should be remanded for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^AayofJanuary, 2007. 
^RoberJJ. Dale 
Bradley L. Tilt! 
Matthew B. Hutchinson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, PC 
Attorneys for Defendant /Appellant 
Dixie Riding Club, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT DIXIE RIDING CLUB, INC. were mailed by first-class mail with 
postage fully prepaid this ay of January, 2007, to: 
V. Lowry Snow 
Lewis P. Reece 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
134 North 200 East, Suite 302 
St. George, Utah 84771 
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FILED 
JAN 112006 
v fFTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COtfRT^fcH , N G T O N C 0 U N T Y 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JENNINGS INVESTMENT, LC, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DIXIE RIDING CLUB, INC., et al„ 
Defendants. 
RULINGS ON MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030500781 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before me pursuant to Defendant's "Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment" and Plaintiffs' "Cross Motion for Summary Judgment." Each party filed the necessary 
supporting and opposing memoranda, affidavits and other materials. Having studied the memoranda 
and other documents, having heard the arguments of counsel at a hearing, and having reviewed the 
file for this action, I have determined to deny Defendant's Motion and to grant Plaintiffs' Motion. 
I will not undertake extensive analysis,1 however, and will only make a few observations: 
1. Defendant's supporting memorandum does not meet the formal or substantive 
requirements of Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment. 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would be denied for this reason alone, because 
Defendant cannot meet its burden of proof without substantially complying with these rules. 
2. Plaintiffs' supporting memorandum and materials are thorough and comprehensive, 
'The brevity of this Ruling is not indicative of the time I have spent in the review of these Motions. It has 
been my experience and that of other judges of the trial bench, however, that the parties are primarily interested in 
the outcome and that the appellate courts seldom acknowledge the opinions and reasoning of the trial courts. In 
addition, the Utah appellate courts have consistently reversed far more summary judgment decisions than they have 
affirmed. Finally, Plaintiffs' memoranda and materials are clearly more detailed and analytical than Defendant's 
memoranda and materials, so that few serious issues are adequately framed for discussion. Consequently, the time 
required to prepare a comprehensive memorandum decision does not seem to be warranted. 
and they substantially comply with the requirements of Rules 7 and 56. Plaintiffs have established 
their factual statements by competent evidence, so that Defendant was required to respond as 
provided in Rule 7(c)(3)(B). Defendant did not do so, however; Plaintiff is correct in noting that 
it is not the court's burden "to ferret out Defendant's attempts to controvert Plaintiffs' facts by a 
careful winnowing of Defendant's evidence." See "Reply in re: Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment," p. 4. Consequently, each fact set forth in Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts "is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment." See Rule 7(c)(3)(A). 
3. Plaintiffs' memoranda also clearly analyze the relevant precedents of the Utah 
appellate courts and their application to the issues of this case. Defendant's arguments are also clear, 
but in my judgment, are not correct as to the facts which are without controversy in this case. 
4. The facts before me for purposes of summary judgment clearly demonstrate that the 
disputed property was "continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of [far more than] 
ten years," as is required to establish dedication and abandonment to the use of the public pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. 
5. Defendant has provided no authority for its argument that Plaintiffs lack standing to 
maintain this action. The Utah precedents cited by both parties demonstrate that an action under 
Section 72-5-104 can be maintained by private citizens. 
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is hereby denied and Plaintiffs' Motion is hereby granted. 
Plaintiffs' counsel should submit an appropriate judgment. 
Dated this \C> day of January, 2006. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this j , / -» day ol\J(Ju/1^2006,1 provided true and correct copies 
of the foregoing RULING to each of the attorneys named below by placing a copy in such attorney's 
file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah: 
V. Lowry Snow and 
Lewis P. Reece 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Alan D. Boyack and 
Matthew Bishop 
Attorneys for Defendant 
OF COURT 
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ADDENDUM NO. 2 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
V. Lowry Snow [3030] 
Lewis P. Reece [5785] 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
134 North 200 East, Suite 302 
St. George, Utah 84771-2747 
Telephone: (435) 628-3688 
Telecopier: (435) 628-3275 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JENNINGS INVESTMENT, LC, GILBERT 
JENNINGS, MANSFIELD JENNINGS, 
CONRAD BOWLER, LEWIS J. AND 
DORCUS N. BOWLER, H. VAL HAFEN, 
RANDY AND GAI BOWLER, TROY AND 
KERRIE BOWLER, JOHN BOWLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DLXIE RIDING CLUB, INC., a Utah Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 
20, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 030500781 
Judge: G. Rand Beacham 
Defendant having filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs having filed a 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, and following oral argument on both motions on 
November 10, 2005, and the Court having previously entered its Ruling on Motions for 
Summary Judgment on January 12,2006, the Court now makes and enters its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court has studied in depth the parties' respective memoranda and affidavits. 
Defendant has not properly objected to the facts as alleged by Plaintiff, by "specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact" as Defendant is required to do under the 
rules. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Defendant cannot simply rely on its pleadings but has an 
affirmative duty to controvert Plaintiffs' alleged facts. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health 
Center. Inc.. 2003 UT 23 If 50, 70 P.3d 904; Rawson v. Conover. 2001 UT 24% 25, 20 P.3d 876; 
R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068, 1078 (Utah 1997); Jones v. 
Hinkle. 611 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1980). Moreover, Defendant failed to separately state each fact 
in support of its motion, numbering those facts and supporting them by citation to relevant 
materials such as affidavits or discovery materials, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A and 
B). The facts alleged by Plaintiffs are therefore deemed admitted. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(A). 
Moreover, because Plaintiffs' facts are properly supported as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(c)(3)(A) and 56(e), and are not properly contested by Defendant, the Court finds the following 
material facts by clear and convincing evidence, there being no competent evidence against 
Plaintiffs' alleged facts and the same being deemed admitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(A). 
2. The property that is the subject matter of this dispute was originally owned by the 
Washington County Sheriffs Posse and established as a race track and stables for horses roughly 
50 years ago. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, % 2. As shown on Exhibit E of Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Support, which is a copy of Defendant's Answers to Discovery, and Exhibit A 
thereto, which is a copy of the owners' dedication plat, (hereinafter "the Owners' Dedication 
Plat"), the road that is the subject of this dispute surrounds the race track and arena, and is 
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located in Washington County, State of Utah and is more particularly legally described in the 
Owners' Dedication Plat as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 0°36'20" West 515.18 feet along the Section 
Line from the Southeast Corner of Section 14, Township 42 South, 
Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 
89°33' West 425.44 feet to a point of curvature of a 20.00 foot radius 
curve to the left; thence along the arc of said curve 31.47 feet to a point 
on 1100 West Street; thence along said city street North 0°36'20" West 
90.24 feet to a point on a 20.245 foot radius curve to the left (center 
bears North 89°23'40" East); thence Southeasterly along the arc of said 
curve 31.75 feet to a point of a tangency; thence North 89°33' East 
345.22 feet to a point of curvature of a 30.00 foot radius curve to the 
left; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve 47.205 feet to a 
point of tangency; thence North 0°36'20" West 1148.73 feet to a point of 
curvature of a 20.245 foot radius curve to the left; thence North westerly 
along the arc of said curve 31.75 feet to a point on a county road; thence 
along said county road North 89°33' East 24.19 feet to the point of a 
209.40 foot radius curve to the right (center bears S 0°27'00" E); thence 
Southeasterly along the arc of said curve 78.39 feet to a point on a 
22.316 foot radius curve to the left (center bears S 2 1 W W); thence 
along the arc of said curve 43.47 feet to a point of tangency, said point 
being on the Section Line; thence along said Section Line South 
0°36'20" East 1213.67 feet to the point of beginning Containing 1.901 
Acres. 
For convenience hereinafter, the road more particularly described above shall be referred to as 
the "1020 West X 1050 North Street" or "the subject road" or "the subject roadway." 
3. Plaintiffs Jennings Investment, LC, H. Val Hafen, Lewis and Dorcus Bowler, 
Randy and Gale Bowler, Troy and Carry Bowler, and John Bowler own property that abuts the 
subject roadway. Plaintiffs Gilbert Jennings, Mansfield Jennings and Conrad Bowler, however, 
do not own property that abuts the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. See Affidavit of Gilbert 
Jennings, 1f 2; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 2; and Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 3. 
Indeed, Conrad Bowler was one of the original members of the Sheriffs Posse who got together 
and purchased the subject property in approximately 1955. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 2. 
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4. From the time the Sheriffs Posse built the arena until shortly after Washington 
County built the arena neighboring the Purgatory Correctional Facility, the posse arena was the 
location of numerous rodeos for children and high school rodeos, horse racing and barrel racing, 
amateur rodeos including rodeos on New Year's Day, and other similar events to which the 
general public was invited. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 4; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, % 3; 
Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, f 3; and Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 3. 
5. Notwithstanding, after these public events, Defendant's permission to use the 
1020 West X 1050 North Street was withdrawn. "The Defendants [sic] concede that members of 
the public have been invited to attend different rodeo type advents [sic], such as calf roping, etc., 
to which their permission ceased after the event was concluded." Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support, page 4 (emphasis added). See also Affidavit of Charles Welch, ^ ft[ 8, 9 and 10. Indeed, 
sometime roughly between 1985 and 1990, Defendant began constructing a gate across 1020 
West X 1050 North Street to prevent the general public's access through the road, but following 
some dispute, the gate was never completed and public access remained unimpeded. Affidavit of 
Val Hafen, f 6. The public rodeo events to which the general public was invited occurred 
approximately between four to six times a year. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 4. 
6. Much of the property in the Bowler, Ence and Marsh subdivision which was west 
of the Posse arena was used by the owners as horse property. This was the primary purpose of 
the Bowler Ence Subdivision. Affidavit of Conrad Bower, f 2. The Bowler Ence Subdivision 
along with the Posse property "was horse country. Numerous people stabled horses, sold horses, 
bred horses, and people drove vehicles, rode horses and walked on the subject road to do their 
business." Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, ^  7. 
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7. Although Defendant's implied permission to use 1020 West X 1050 North Street 
was withdrawn, Property owners who owned horses west of the arena frequently rode their 
horses through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street because that road was not paved and was 
easier on their horses' hooves and safer for the riders. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 5. The 
1020 West X 1050 North Street was frequently used by horse owners to ride their horses from 
one part of the neighborhood to another part of the neighborhood. On the north end of the 1020 
West X 1050 North Street was a trail head. Horse riders would go from the Bowler Ence 
Subdivision through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street and ride up in the north country, 
sometimes to the area now known as Winchester Hills or to Snow Canyon. Affidavit of Conrad 
Bowler, f 5; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, % 4; Affidavit of Val Hafen, f 4 Affidavit of Gilbert 
Jennings, f 4; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 4; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 4. A road went 
on up to the old turkey farm north of the Posse arena and was straight up the 1100 West Street. 
See Owners' Dedication Plat. Instead of riding up 1100 West, people often rode their horses up 
the 1020 West X 1050 North Street to get to the old turkey farm. The subject road was open, and 
access was open and unimpeded. The subject road did not dead end in any fashion and was 
continually used by the general public to ride their horses as described above from about 1972 
until 2002. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, f 5; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, If 4; Affidavit of Gilbert 
Jennings, f 4; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 4; and Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, % 4. 
8* In addition, people frequently walked through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street 
or drove cars though it to get from one part of the neighborhood to the next. This occurred 
almost on a daily basis. Numerous people stabled their horses, sold horses and bred horses in the 
area, and the general public drove vehicles, rode horses, and walked on and through the 1020 
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West X 1050 North Street to do their business and to cross from 1100 West Street in St. George 
to get to the 1230 North Street. The Ence brothers had a feed store and mill just west of 1100 
West Street for about ten years, and many people used the subject road to get to the feed mill 
from the 1230 North Street. Further, just south of the arena, for three or four years in the 1980s, 
a tack and saddle shop operated selling saddles and tack to the general public. The general 
public gained access to this tack shop by traveling through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. 
The subject road was well traveled and continuously traveled by the public in general from about 
1972 until roughly 2002. No gates limited access to the subject road or through the subject road 
in any fashion. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, Iff 7, 10, 11; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, ff 5, 8, 11; 
Affidavit of Val Hafen, f 5; Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, % 6; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 
5; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 5. 
9. Moreover, people frequently practiced rodeo events at the arena or simply in 
general practiced to improve their roping, barrel racing, etc., and these practices were not public 
events. Notwithstanding, often times the general public came to watch these practices. Affidavit 
of Conrad Bowler, f 9; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, % 7; Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, % 8; 
Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, ^ f 7. 
10. There were never any restrictions for use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street 
until about three years ago. The general public drove through it to get from one end of the 
neighborhood to the next, rode horses on it to get from one part of the neighborhood to the other, 
drove on it to watch friends practice rodeo events, drove on it to take horses to be bred or 
stabled, drove on it to buy horses and sell horses, and drove on it to buy or fix saddles and tack. 
This occurred continuously and almost on a daily basis from about 1972 until approximately two 
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years ago when the Defendant put up gates across the subject road. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, 
K 8; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, f 10; Affidavit of Val Hafen, % 6; Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, f 
9; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, % 8; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 6. 
11. Notwithstanding this access by the general public, Defendant and its predecessors 
in title did not give any specific permission to use the subject road. Rather permission was 
implied to use the road but only during scheduled public events. Affidavit of Charles Welch, Hf 
8, 9 and 10; Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, If 8; Affidavit of Gilbert Jennings, % 6. 
12. During the last 30 years, from about 1972 until roughly 2002, the 1020 West X 
1050 North Street was graveled and graded occasionally by both St. George City and 
Washington County. Affidavit of Conrad Bowler, % 12; Affidavit of Ethan Bundy, ^ f 6; Affidavit 
of Gilbert Jennings, % 7; Affidavit of Mansfield Jennings, f 6. 
13. Moreover, from 1982 until 2002, the subject road was specifically omitted by 
legal description from the tax rolls of property that was assessed for property tax in Washington 
County. Affidavit of David Elweese, ^ flf 19 and 20. 
14. The photograph identified in the Affidavit of Charles Welch filed in support of 
Defendant's motion is misleading. As stated in that affidavit, the photograph was recently taken. 
Affidavit of Charles Welch, 1f 11. Because of the gate across the 1020 West X 1050 North Street 
the dispute between the parties, the City of St. George has discontinued grading the subject road, 
and the subject road has fallen into disrepair. Indeed, Charles Welch dug the trench where the 
weeds are growing and then placed telephone poles as shown in the photograph, along the side 
so people could not go around the poles and drive on the subject road. Affidavit of Conrad 
Bowler, f 13; Affidavit of Val Hafen, % 7; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 7. Defendant has 
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harassed those who attempt to use the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. Affidavit of Val Hafen, f 
10; Affidavit of Lewis Bowler, f 9. 
15. Defendant itself admits that the public has had open and free access on the subject 
road and that only when Plaintiff Jennings Investment built the shopping center complex was 
access restricted. In relevant part, Defendant states in response to Plaintiffs' discovery requests 
as follows: 
Admission No. 14. Please admit that the general public would 
watch both Dixie Riding Club members or Posse members and non 
members alike as they practiced calf roping, bull dogging, barrel 
racing and other rodeo related events, in preparation for public 
events to be held both at the Dixie Riding Club arena and 
elsewhere, or as they practice just for fun, and that the general 
public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Road in doing so, and 
that this took place for a continuous period in excess often years 
sometime between 1967 and the present. 
Answer to Admission No. 14. As it hereto has been articulated in 
other admissions, any and all access to the property in question 
was, in fact, done with the implied or express permission of the 
general leadership, or membership of the Dixie Riding Club, Inc. 
There has never been a time since 1967 up until approximately two 
(2) years ago, there was any necessity of blocking any traffic of 
any persons not specifically members of the Dixie Riding Club, 
Inc., because open and free access existed to the south, to the west 
and to the north. Only when the Plaintiffs, Jennings built a 
shopping center complex, did the restriction of access to the areas, 
having heretofore been articulated, was [sic] cut off by the 
fabrication of the shopping center complex. Therefore, Admission 
No. 14 is not admitted. 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support, Exhibit E, page 6 (emphasis added). 
16. In addition, Defendant attempted to dedicate this road formally to the City of St. 
George in May, 1987. See Owners' Dedication Plat. This plat has never been recorded, but 
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again evidences the "open and free access" Defendant referred to in responding to Request for 
Admission No. 14. 
17. Moreover, numerous deeds and documents recorded with the Washington County 
Recorder signed by Defendant, its predecessors and other property owners evidence the 
Defendant's understanding and the public's practice that the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was 
a public thoroughfare. 
a. On May 30,1974, Defendant deeded a four foot easement to the City of St. 
George which was added to an existing 46 foot right-of-way easement the 
City held, making a total 50 foot easement. The May 30,1974 warranty deed 
specifically refers to the subject road and states that: "[t]he following 
described property to be added to and be part of an existing roadway, to be 
used by the grantee as and for a public roadway and easement for utilities." 
(emphasis added). The grantee on the deed was the City of St. George. The 
"existing roadway" referred to was the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. See 
Affidavit of David Elweese, % 6 and A.4.1 attached which is a certified copy 
of the subject deed. A certified copy of the original 46 foot Right-of-Way 
Easement is attached as Exhibit A.4.2 thereto. 
b. Defendant incorporated in its right-of-way easement to the City of St. George, 
see copy attached as Exhibit A.4.2, the 1020 West X 1050 North Street, 
specifically granting the easement within the road by describing the easement 
as going up "to the west line of a 46 foot road; thence south 0° 36'20" east 
1199.00 feet along said west line of road." And further describing the east 
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and west portion of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street by stating that the 
easement was within the 50 feet "to the south line of a 50 foot road" and 
continuing "East 445.50 feet along said South line of road." See Affidavit of 
David Elweese and Exhibit A.4.2 thereto. This road described in the legal 
description as referenced above is the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. See 
Affidavit of David Elweese, f 7, and Exhibit A.4.2 thereto. 
c. Similarly, on May 30,1974, the then owners of the property shown as "SG-6-
2-14-2217," Jerry, Carolyn and Brent Atkin, deeded the east four feet of their 
property to the City of St. George, "to be used by the grantee as and for a 
public roadway and easement for utilities." See Affidavit of David Elweese, f 
8, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.4.3 thereto. 
d. Again on May 30,1974, then owners of the property shown as "SG-6-2-14-
2218," Anthony and Nina Atkin, deeded the east four feet of their property to 
the City of St. George "to be used by the grantee as and for a public roadway 
and easement for utilities." See Affidavit of David Elweese, f 9, and Exhibits 
A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.4 thereto. 
e. On May 30,1974, then owners of the property identified as "SG-6-2-14-
2219," LaVar and Leah Bracken, likewise deeded the east four feet of their 
property to the City of St. George "to be used by the grantee as and for a 
public roadway and easement for utilities." See Affidavit of David Elweese, % 
10, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.5 thereto. 
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f. Again on May 30,1974, then owners of the property identified as "SG-6-2-
14-2220," Sherrell and Jeri Newby and Kenneth and Sherrell Newby, deeded 
the east four feet of their property to the City of St. George "to be used by the 
grantee as and for a public roadway and easement for utilities." See Affidavit 
of David Elweese, f 11, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.6 thereto. 
g. When Defendant sold the property identified in the Affidavit of David 
Elweese in Exhibit A.2.2 as "SG-6-2-14-2317," they specifically incorporated 
the 1020 West X 1050 North Street into the legal description of the property 
and referred to it as a road, not an easement, by stating that the southeast 
corner of that lot starts "on the west line of a 46 foot road," and then runs 
north "100 feet along said West line of road" to the south line of 1230 North 
Street in St. George. See Affidavit of David Elweese, f^ 12, and Exhibits 
A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.7 thereto. 
h. When Defendant deeded the property identified by tax serial number in the 
Affidavit of David Elweese in Exhibit A.2.2 as "SG-6-2-14-2218," they again 
incorporated the subject road as part of the legal description and referred to it 
as a road, not an easement, by stating that the northeast corner of that lot lies 
"on the West line of a 46 foot road," and that the east boundary of the lot runs 
"100.00 feet along said West line of road." Affidavit of David Elweese, j^ 13, 
and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.8 thereto. 
i. Again, when Defendant deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of 
David Elweese in Exhibit A.2.2 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2219," it 
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identified that property by specifically referring to the 1020 West X 1050 
North Street as a road. The southeast corner of that property begins "at a 
point on the West line of a 46.00 foot road," and the east boundary of that 
property runs north from that point "100 feet along said West line of road." 
See Affidavit of David Elweese, f 14, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.9 
thereto. 
j . When Defendant deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of David 
Elweese in Exhibit A.2.2 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2220," it once 
again incorporated the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a road not an 
easement. The northeast corner of that lot begins "at a point on the West line 
of a 46.00 foot Road," and runs south "100 feet along said West line of road." 
See Affidavit of David Elweese, % 15, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.4.10 
thereto. 
k. On the south end of the 1020 West X 1050 North road, when Defendant 
deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of David Elweese in Exhibit 
A.2.1 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2221," Defendant identified that 
property by referring to the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a road. The 
northeast corner of that property begins on the "South line of a 50.00 foot 
Road, and then runs west "205.50 feet along said South line of Road." See 
Affidavit of David Elweese, % 16, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.4.11 
thereto. 
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1. When Defendant deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of David 
Elweese in Exhibit A.2.1 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2213," it again 
identified the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a road, not as an easement. 
The northwest corner of that property begins at "the south line of a 50 foot 
road," and then runs east "178.00 feet along said South line of Road." See 
Affidavit of David Elweese, f 17, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.4.12 
thereto, 
m. Finally, when Defendant deeded the property identified in the Affidavit of 
David Elweese in Exhibit A.2.1 by tax serial number "SG-6-2-14-2212," it 
identified the south boundary of that property as beginning on "the North line 
of a 50 foot road," which is the 1020 West X 1050 North Street, and 
continuing "East 178.00 feet along said North line of Road." See Affidavit of 
David Elweese, f 18, and Exhibits A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.4.13 thereto. 
These facts set out above and supported by the Affidavit of David Elweese are essentially 
admitted by Defendant. See Second Affidavit of Charles Welch, % 4. 
18. Defendant has refused to remove the gates blocking access to the 1020 West X 
1050 North Street although Plaintiffs have made written demand to remove this gate and keep it 
open. See Affidavit of Val Hafen, ff 9 and 10, and Exhibits A and B thereto. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court now enters its Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action and pursue a public dedication under 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. The vast majority, if not all of the cases addressing Utah Code 
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Ann. § 72-5-104, or its predecessor, involve private parties as the proponent of the public 
thoroughfare. None of the parties, including Defendant, have brought to this Court's attention 
any case that dismisses a public dedication suit because the moving party was not a municipality 
or dismisses the suit because a municipality or governmental agency was not made party to the 
suit. Moreover, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 does not limit its use to 
municipalities, the state or some other governmental agency and does not require that any of the 
latter be joined as a party to the suit. 
2. The testimony in the Affidavits of Conrad Bowler, Val Hafen, Ethan Bundy, 
Gilbert Jennings, Mansfield Jennings and Lewis Bowler is not incompetent or lacking in 
foundation merely because Defendant alleges these parties have owned or presently own 
property that abuts the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. Further, Plaintiffs do not lack standing 
to sue for a public dedication based upon Defendant's claim that Plaintiffs have owned or 
presently own property abutting the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. First, as discussed more 
specifically in this Court's Findings above, ^ 1, the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs are deemed 
admitted. Plaintiffs are correct that "[i]t is not for the Court to ferret out Defendant's attempts to 
controvert Plaintiffs' facts by a careful winnowing of Defendant's evidence." Plaintiffs' Reply 
at 4. Second, the only evidence the Court can find to rebut the clear statement by Conrad Bowler 
for example, one of the plaintiffs, in paragraph 3 of his Affidavit that he does not presently own 
property that abuts the 1020 West X 1050 North Street, is a vague reference in paragraph 3 of the 
Second Affidavit of Charles Welch, wherein he states: "I know that each one of them [the 
Plaintiffs] has been, or in fact, is presently an adjacent property owner." That vague statement 
does not provide evidence contrary to the clear statement by Conrad Bowler that he presently 
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does not own property that abuts the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. Moreover, the Court does 
not believe the case law should be construed to limit parties owning land that abuts a claimed 
dedicated road from filing suit to establish the dedication. Rather the testimony relied on must 
establish use by the public, not use by some private right which is precisely the case here. The 
testimony is undisputed that the general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. 
Accordingly, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit and that the 
evidence is clear under the law to render judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. 
3. To establish a public dedication within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104, the testimony must clearly establish that there was (1) continuous use of the 1020 West X 
1050 North Street, (2) as a public thoroughfare, namely, (i) that there was passing or travel, (ii) 
by the public, and (iii) the use was not by permission, and (3) that this use must have been for at 
least a ten year period. See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307.310, 311 (Utah 1997). 
This Court will address each of those elements in turn. 
4. The evidence is clear that use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was 
continuous. The testimony presented by affidavit and unrebutted by Defendant establishes that 
from approximately 1972 or 1973 until approximately two years ago, a period in excess of 30 
years, the general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street without interruption. The 
evidence clearly establishes that no gates limited access to the subject road or through the subject 
road in any fashion. There appears to be from the evidence a short period of time sometime 
during 1985 and 1990, when Defendant put up posts in an attempt to build a gate across the 1020 
West X 1050 North Street, but Defendant did not proceed with the gate following a "brief legal 
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dispute," and "[a]ccess through the subject road remained unimpeded." Affidavit of Val Hafen, 
f 6; see also Findings, f 5 above. 
5, The evidence is further clear that use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was 
by the public during this period of time and that the public used the 1020 West X 1050 North 
Street for passing or travel, namely, as a public thoroughfare. See Findings, fflj 4 through 10,12 
and 13. The public had a "general right of passage" through the 1020 West X 1050 North Street. 
Heber City, 942 P.2d at 311. The street was not laid out or used as a private way, but as a public 
way. Id. The general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as often as "they deemed 
'convenient or necessary.'" AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen. 2005 UT App. 168, f 11. The 1020 
West X 1050 North Street was not used as the road was used in Morris v. Blunt. In Morris, the 
property owner, "plowed the road," rolled boulders from adjoining plowed land "into the road," 
closed the road for five years before the action was commenced, and otherwise evidenced that he 
had no intent to dedicate the road as a public thoroughfare. Morris v. Blunt. 49 Utah 243, 250, 
161 P. 1127 (1916). While the land owner's intent or consent is no longer an element under 
Utah law, Heber City. 942 P.2d at 311, still the use of the road in Morris was not at the public's 
convenience as use of the road clearly was in this case. Moreover, in Morris, the evidence did 
not disclose how many public users there even were, nor "how frequently they used the road, by 
what right they traveled the road, nor the circumstances of their use" or really anything about the 
public's use of the road. Morris, 49 Utah at 251. The same is not true in this case as 
demonstrated by the Findings above. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the general public 
used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a thoroughfare in that there was passing or travel by 
the public. 
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6. Moreover, use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was not with Defendant's 
permission as Defendant now conveniently argues. The facts speak differently. Though 
Defendant gave implied permission for the public to travel on the 1020 West X 1050 North 
Street during public events, Defendant withdrew that permission after the public events 
concluded. These public events occurred only four to six times a year. Findings, f 5 above. 
Yet, the evidence is clear that the general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street on 
almost a daily basis. Findings, ffl| 4 through 10. Clearly the general public used the 1020 West 
X 1050 North Street at their convenience as opposed to Defendant's convenience. Defendant 
points to no evidence whatsoever, other than its present argument of implied or express 
permission, that use of the 1020 West X 1050 North Street was with its permission. Defendant 
points to no signs or other indicia that the public had permission to use the 1020 West X 1050 
North Street, and indeed stated that: "There has never been a time since 1967 up until 
approximately two (2) years ago, [that] there was any necessity of blocking any traffic of any 
persons not specifically members of the Dixie Riding Club, Inc., because open and free access 
existed to the south, to the west and to the north." See Findings, f 15 above, and Defendant's 
Answer to Request for Admission No. 14 (emphasis supplied). Defendant cannot reasonably 
argue that the public had implied permission to use the 1020 West X 1050 North Street simply 
because the public had "open and free access" through the street. Such open and free access 
alone is not legally sufficient to grant the public permission to use the subject road, foreclosing 
Plaintiffs' claim of public dedication. To the contrary, such "open and free access" is the 
epitome of evidence that the general public used the 1020 West X 1050 North Street as a public 
thoroughfare. 
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7. Finally, the evidence is clear that the general public's use was for at least ten 
years. 
8. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the 1020 West X 1050 North Street "is 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104, and a Decree of Dedication should issue consistent with these Findings and Conclusions. 
DATED this *^T day ofFgbraafy, 2006. 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
f^Q\^A hb£ct~&A 
G. Rand Beacham 
District Judge 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JENNINGS INVESTMENT, LC, GILBERT 
JENNINGS, MANSFIELD JENNINGS, 
CONRAD BOWLER, LEWIS J. AND 
DORCUS N. BOWLER, H. VAL HAFEN, 
RANDY AND GAI BOWLER, TROY AND 
KERRIE BOWLER, JOHN BOWLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DIXIE RIDING CLUB, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 
20, 
Defendants. 
DECREE OF DEDICATION 
Civil No. 030500781 
Judge: G. Rand Beacham 
This Court having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
finding good cause therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the following real 
property to the extent owned by Dixie Riding Club, Inc., is dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, which property is located in 
Washington County, State of Utah, and is more particularly described as follows: 
- 7 AN ||: 3 7 
J- * i 1 
Beginning at a point North 0°36'20" West 515.18 feet along the Section 
Line from the Southeast Comer of Section 14, Township 42 South, 
Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 
89°33' West 425.44 feet to a point of curvature of a 20.00 foot radius 
curve to the left; thence along the arc of said curve 31.47 feet to a point 
on 1100 West Street; thence along said city street North 0°36'20" West 
90.24 feet to a point on a 20.245 foot radius curve to the left (center 
bears North 89°23'40" East); thence Southeasterly along the arc of said 
curve 31.75 feet to a point of a tangency; thence North 89°33' East 
345.22 feet to a point of curvature of a 30.00 foot radius curve to the 
left; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve 47.205 feet to a 
point of tangency; thence North 0°36'20" West 1148.73 feet to a point of 
curvature of a 20.245 foot radius curve to the left; thence North westerly 
along the arc of said curve 31.75 feet to a point on a county road; thence 
along said county road North 89°33' East 24.19 feet to the point of a 
209.40 foot radius curve to the right (center bears S 0°27'00" E); thence 
Southeasterly along the arc of said curve 78.39 feet to a point on a 
22.316 foot radius curve to the left (center bears S 21°00' W); thence 
along the arc of said curve 43.47 feet to a point of tangency, said point 
being on the Section Line; thence along said Section Line South 
0°36'20" East 1213.67 feet to the point of beginning Containing 1.901 
Acres. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this dedication and 
abandonment to the public is effective immediately upon entry of this Decree of Dedication with 
the clerk of this Court. 
DATED this " ^ day of Febri iy, 2006. 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
G. Rand Beacham 
District Judge 
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Secretary 
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Renfro v. mcCowanD.Utah,2006.Only the Westlaw 
citation is currently available. 
United States District Court,D. Utah,Central 
Division. 
Hal D. RENFRO, Trustee of the Renfro Family 
Trust, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Milo McCOWAN, et al., Defendants. 
No.2:05-CV-00498. 
Nov. 9, 2006. 
E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff. 
Gary G. Kuhlmann, St. George, UT, for Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PAUL G. CASSELL, District Judge. 
*1 This case requires the court to determine 
whether an informal road that traverses through 
both defendants' and plaintiffs land has been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public. 
Plaintiff Hal D. Renfro ("Renfro") believes that he 
has presented clear and convincing evidence that 
the informal road in issue (the "Road") has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period of ten years, and has thus been abandoned 
and dedicated to the use of the public. Defendants 
argue that Renfro has failed to meet this burden 
because of an alleged lack of evidence showing that 
the Road has been used continuously for ten years, 
and an alleged dispute as to whether it is, in deed, 
the "public" that has used the Road. The court 
agrees with Renfro that he has presented clear and 
convincing evidence that the Road has been 
dedicated to the public. Consequently, the court 
GRANTS his motion for summary judgment (# 53) 
in so far as the court finds that the Road has been 
abandoned and dedicated to the use of the public. 
Also before the court is a motion for partial 
summary judgment filed by defendants (# 61). In 
addition to addressing the Road issue in their brief, 
defendants argue that some of the named parties 
have been wrongfully named as defendants in this 
action. The court finds that all of the named 
defendants have an interest in the Road, either as 
owners of the land directly affected by the Road or 
simply as potential future users of the Road. The 
court's holding on the Road issue does not involve 
damages. Moreover, the named defendant 
responsible for the alleged trespass and grading of 
Renfro's property, the only issue in this case that 
may result in damages, has offered to restore the 
Renfro land to its original condition. Consequently, 
the court DENIES defendants' motion for partial 
summary judgment (# 61). The court's granting of 
Renfro's motion for summary judgment effectively 
closes this case. All claims having been resolved, 
the court directs the Clerk's Office to close this case. 
BACKGROUND 
When considering a motion for summary judgment, 
the court views the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.™1 Viewed in 
this light, the record reflects the following facts. 
FN1. Cortez v. McCauley, 438 F.3d 980, 
988 (10th Cir.2006). 
A. The Renfro Property 
Renfro is the owner in trust of a parcel of land (the " 
Point") on the top of a ridge that overlooks the 
Green Valley Golf Course in St. George, Utah. It 
may go without stating that the Point is located on 
the point of the ridge. On June 28, 2005, Renfro 
deeded property working down the "back" and " 
sides" of the Point to a real estate development firm 
not currently involved in this case. Although no 
access right-of-way was retained by Renfro with 
regard to the transfer of land to the real estate 
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development firm, Renfro contends that access to 
the Point from this transferred land is impractical 
due to the steep terrain. The "frontside" of the Point 
currently borders land owned by Defendant QRS, 
Inc. ("QRS"). Renfro believes that the Point could 
be developed within the requirements of local laws 
and regulations for one or two residential lots worth 
several hundred thousand dollars each. 
B. The QRS Property 
*2 QRS is an owner or developer of the Highlands 
Green Valley subdivision (the "Highlands") in St. 
George, Utah. Defendant Milo McCowan (" 
McCowan") is a partner in both QRS and Castle 
Rock Development of Southern Utah, LLC, (" 
Castle Rock") two companies that consist of the 
same members. In the Fall of 2003, Castle Rock 
purchased the parcel of land currently being 
developed as the Highlands from the Kay Traveller 
Development Company. Kay Traveller owned this 
property for at least ten years prior to the 
conveyance to Castle Rock. Shortly after the 
acquisition, Castle Rock deeded the land to QRS. 
The QRS property borders the Renfro property at 
the southeast corner of the Highlands. The southeast 
quadrant of the Highlands is a steep, 
southeast-trending ridge that leads to the Point. 
QRS has platted three lots that would come within 
about 120 feet of the Renfro property. More 
importantly, these three platted lots are located over 
the Road where it reaches the Point. 
C The Road 
In the vicinity of the Highlands and the Point are a 
number of informal, unpaved roads that connect to 
various public ways. The informal road at issue-the 
Road-extends along the ridge of the Highlands and 
ends in a loop around the perimeter of the Point. 
The loop is formed around the outer limits of the 
flat surface of the Point, and reconnects with the 
Road of which it is a part. 
QRS has platted the Highlands to utilize the Road 
as an access to many of the lots. The improved 
Road ends in a cul-de-sac at the lots bordering the 
Renfro property, and has been labeled Pike Circle. 
The cul-de-sac destroys the bottom part of the loop 
at the end of the Road, disconnecting the remainder 
of the loop from the rest of the Road of which it is a 
part. In the course of construction of the Highlands, 
Quality Excavation, under contract to QRS, entered 
the Point and graded and removed a portion of the 
Point's surface. Quality Excavation subsequently 
offered to restore the Point to its original condition. 
Renfro has provided aerial photographs from 1978, 
1985, and 2004, which show the existence of the 
Road. The Road can be plainly seen in all three 
photographs. Gary Esplin and McCowan, two 
long-time residents of St. George, both confirmed 
that the 1985 and 2004 photographs accurately 
depict the Road and its surrounding area. As a 
long-time resident of St. George, McCowan also 
noted that the area around the Road has been 
notorious for four-wheelers and motorcycles to ride. 
Having raised his kids in that area from 1980 
through 1988, McCowan referred to the area of the 
Road as "four-wheeler heaven for the kids." FN2 
Mr. Esplin is also aware that the area has been used 
for such purposes. 
FN2. McCowan Dep. 15:2-3, Apr. 18, 
2006. 
Speaking specifically about the Road, McCowan 
testified that "it's a place where people used to drive 
out and drive to the end, and once they got to the 
end, they had no place to go but turn around and 
come back out. It's a view spot." FN3 McCowan 
noted that people would go and look off that point 
much like they would look off other points. Jack 
Willis, another long-time resident/visitor of the 
area, is the owner of an interest in a Sports Village 
condominium located in the general vicinity of the 
Road. He has observed that the Road has been used 
frequently over the past twenty-one years by all 
types of outdoor vehicles. Mr. Willis, himself, has 
often used the Road over this twenty-one year 
period. 
FN3.W. 18:1-5. 
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*3 Mr. Traveller, in his affidavit, states that neither 
he nor his company ever permitted the public to 
come onto his property, or attempted to deter 
anyone from use of the Road. Moreover, McCowan 
was unaware of any barriers or blockage to use of 
the trails in the area of the Road for the entire time 
that he has been familiar with the area. 
Based upon these facts, Renfro argues that he has 
satisfied his burden to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Road has been 
dedicated to public use. QRS contends that Renfro 
has failed to establish undisputed facts which would 
support summary judgment on this issue. In 
addition to the Road dispute, Renfro argues that 
defendants have graded and removed soil from its 
property without permission and in trespass. 
Because Quality Excavation has offered to restore 
the laud affected by its trespass and grading of the 
Point, FN4 the court will limit its discussion to the 
issue of the potential public thoroughfare. 
FN4. Tomaiko Dep. 37:17-25; 38:21-39:6, 
Apr. 18, 2006; Def.'s Status Report, Aug. 
21, 2006 (Docket No. 66); PL's Mem. 
Supp. Summ. J. 7 (Docket No. 56). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." FN5 In evaluating a 
motion for summary judgment, the evidence and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom should be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, in this case the defendants.*^6 Utah law 
requires that dedication of a road as a public road 
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. FN7 
The "burden of establishing public use for the 
required period of time is on those claiming it." FN8 
F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir .1998). 
FN7. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 
888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) (citing 
Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639, 639 
(Utah 1972)). 
FN8. Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine 
Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 
(Utah 1981). 
DISCUSSION 
Renfro seeks summary judgment on the grounds 
that QRS has platted a portion of the Highlands 
over, and otherwise destroyed an established public 
thoroughfare-the Road-leading to the Renfro 
property. McCowan contends that the Road is not a 
public thoroughfare because Renfto has failed to 
show that the Road has been used continuously by 
the public for a ten year period. The court is 
persuaded that Renfro has met his burden and that 
summary judgment in his favor is proper. 
Under Utah law, "[a] highway is dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period of ten years." FN9 Accordingly, courts 
interpreting this statute (or its similar predecessor) 
require proof of the following three elements before 
finding that a road has been abandoned to the 
public: there must be (1) continuous use, (2) as a 
public thoroughfare, (3) for a period often years. mi° 
The definition of public thoroughfare consists 
of the following: "(0 Where must be 'passing or 
travel,' (ii) the 'use must be by the public/ (iii) use 
by permission does not constitute use as a public 
thoroughfare ..." F N U As noted above, Utah law 
requires that dedication of a public road be proven 
by cleat and convincing evidence.™12 
Consequently, Renfro has the burden to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the Road has 
been abandoned to the public. The court is 
persuaded that Renfro has met this burden. 
FN5. Fed.RCiv.P. Rule 56(c). 
FN6. Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 
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FN 10. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 
P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997). 
FN11. Id. at 311 (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 
161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916)). 
FN12. Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099 
(citing Thomson, 493 P.2d at 639). 
A. Continuous Use for Ten Years 
*4 The first and third elements of the test require 
Renfro to provide clear and convincing evidence 
that the Road has been used continuously for a 
period of ten years. "[Continuous use of a road 
exists when 'the public ... made a continuous and 
uninterrupted use' not necessarily every day, but ' 
as often as they found it convenient or necessary/ " 
FNJ3 Furthermore, "use may be continuous though 
not constant ... provided it occurred as often as the 
claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere 
intermission is not interruption." FN14 
FN13. AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 112 
P.3d 1228, 1230 (Utah Ct.App.2005) 
(quoting Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107, 
109 (Utah 1958)). 
FN14. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 
P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
(citation omitted). 
Renfro has provided aerial photographs from 1978, 
1985, and 2004, which show the existence of the 
Road. The Road is plainly visible in all three 
photographs. McCowan and Esplin both confirmed 
that the 1985 and 2004 photographs accurately 
depict the Road and the area surrounding the Road. 
While this evidence might not be enough by itself to 
show continuous use, Renfro has produced affidavit 
and deposition testimony supporting what the 
photographs plainly suggest. In addition to 
confirming the accurateness of the photographs, 
McCowan also testified that "this [area] has been a 
notorious area for four-wheelers and motorcycles to 
ride." FN15 McCowan, having raised his kids in 
that area from 1980 through 1988, referred to the 
area of the Road as "four-wheeler heaven for the 
kids." mi6 Speaking specifically about the Road, 
McCowan testified that "it's a place where people 
used to drive out and drive to the end, and once they 
got to the end, they had no place to go but turn 
around and come back out. It's a view spot." FN17 
Renfro also supplied the court with an affidavit 
from Jack Willis, in which he states: "In the 
twenty-one years that I have owned property 
nearby, I have observed that this loop has been used 
continuously and frequently by all types of outdoor 
vehicles approaching from the northwest to exploit 
the view from the end of the point. I have often used 
the Road and the loop as described over this period. 
» FN18 
FN15. McCowan Dep. 14:21-22. 
FN16.A/. 15:2-3. 
FN17.M 18:1-5. 
FN18. Willis Aff.H 7. 
The aerial photographs, coupled with the affidavit 
of Jack E. Willis and depositions of McCowan and 
Esplin, provide clear and convincing evidence that 
the Road has been used continuously for at least ten 
years. 
B. Use as a Public Thoroughfare 
The next element for discussion is whether the Road 
has been used as a public thoroughfare. The Utah 
Supreme Court has established three requirements 
that must be satisfied before a road qualifies as a 
public thoroughfare: "(i) [t]here must be 'passing or 
travel,' (ii) the 'use must be by the public,' (iii) use 
by permission does not constitute use as a public 
thoroughfare...." As displayed above, Renfro has 
submitted clear and convincing evidence that there 
has been "travel" on the Road. The court, as more 
fully discussed below, is also persuaded that Renfro 
has produced clear and convincing evidence 
showing that the Road was used by the public, 
without the permission of the private landowners. 
When determining whether it is the public that has 
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used a potential public thoroughfare, it is necessary 
to first define "public." The Utah Court of Appeals 
has noted the importance to distinguish "between 
use of a road by owners of adjoining property and 
by the general public. 'Such property owners 
cannot be considered members of the public 
generally, as that term generally is used in 
dedication by user statutes.' " FN19 The reasoning 
behind this distinction "is because adjoining owners 
may have documentary or prescriptive rights to use 
the road or their use may be by permission of the 
owners of the fee of the road." FN2° Consequently, 
the "public" includes those normally recognized as 
being the public, with the exception of owners of 
adjoining property and those using the road by 
permission. 
FN19. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 
913 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (quoting Peterson 
v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545, 546 (Utah 1968)). 
FN20. Id. 
*5 The record provides clear and convincing 
evidence that the continuous use of the Road has 
been by members of the public. In his affidavit, 
Jack Willis states that the Road has been used "by 
all types of outdoor vehicles approaching from the 
northwest to exploit the view from the end of the 
point.'* FN21 In addition to observing this traffic, 
Mr. Willis states that he has often used the Road 
over the twenty-one years that he has resided in the 
area. FN22 Mr. Willis clearly does not qualify as an 
adjacent landowner. FN23 McCowan admitted that 
individuals used the Road to find a view spot, 
noting that "it's a place where people used to drive 
out and drive to the end, and once they got to the 
end, they had no place to go but turn around and 
come back out." FN24 He states that "people would 
go out and look off that point as they would other 
points." FN25 Additionally, McCowan testified that 
the area around the Road "has been a notorious area 
for four-wheelers and motorcycles to ride" FN26 
and that the area was "four-wheeler heaven" for his 
own kids.FN27 
FN21.WillisAff.H7. 
FN22. Id. 
FN23. See Kohler, 916 P.2d at 913. 
FN24. McCowan Dep. 18:1-4. 
FN25.W. 23:9-10. 
FN26.W. 14:21-22. 
FN27. Id. 15:2-3. 
Commingled with the second prong involving use 
by the public, is the third prong regarding 
permissive use. Under Utah law, "permissive use 
cannot result in either adverse possession or 
dedication of private property to the public." FN28 
Renfro has produced clear and convincing evidence 
to show that the individuals using the Road did not 
have permission. In his affidavit, Mr. Traveller 
states: "Neither I nor my company ever permitted or 
attempted to deter anyone from [use of the Road]. I 
never observed anyone else attempt to deter such 
use." FN29 Mr. Traveller states further that to the 
best of his knowledge, "the public would have had 
unobstructed use of this road throughout the period 
the Highlands property was owned by [his] 
company." FN3° Moreover, McCowan was 
unaware of any barriers or blockage to use of the 
trails in the area of the Road for the entire time that 
he has been familiar with the area. 
FN28. Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809. 
FN29. Traveller Aff.H 5. 
FN30.MU4. 
Accordingly, the unobstructed use of the Road by 
Mr. Willis, coupled with the evidence of 
unobstructed and constant use by numerous 
recreationists and sightseers, provides clear and 
convincing evidence that the users were not 
adjacent landowners, but members of the public 
enjoying the outdoors. Renfro, therefore, has 
provided clear and convincing evidence that the 
Road was a public thoroughfare for the purposes of 
Utah Code § 72-5-104. 
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The court finds that Renfro has shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Road has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period of ten years. 
C. Other Issues 
Defendants point to case law in which the court 
gives considerable weight to the issue of how a 
potential public thoroughfare was created. 
Defendants argue that under Utah law, if a trail was 
created by a past property owner as a private way, " 
it's use, however long, as a private way, does not 
make it a public way; and the mere fact that the 
public also make use of it, without objection from 
the owner of the land, will not make it a public way. 
Before it becomes public in character the owner of 
the land must consent to the change." FN31 
Defendants' reliance on this case law is unhelpful 
for two reasons. First, defendants admit that the " 
trails at issue in this case were not established to 
access any specific portions of property for the 
benefit of any property owner." FN32 Second, and 
more conclusive, this rule of law has been overruled 
in a subsequent Utah Supreme Court decision.™33 
FN31. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1131 
(Utah 1916) (quoting Byron K. Elliott & 
William F. Elliott, A Treatise on the Law 
of Roads and Streets § 5 (1890)). 
FN32. Def.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J. 3. 
FN33. Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099. 
CONCLUSION 
*6 Because Mr. Renfro has provided clear and 
convincing evidence that the Road has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period of ten years, Renfro's motion for summary 
judgment is GRANTED (# 53) in so far as the court 
declares that the Road has been abandoned and 
dedicated to the use of the public. As mentioned 
above, QRS has motioned the court for partial 
summary judgment to remove some of the named 
parties that have allegedly been wrongfully named 
as defendants in this action (# 61). The court's 
holding on the Road issue affected each of the 
named defendants, and because there are no 
damages involved in light of Quality Excavation's 
offer to restore the Renfro property to its original 
condition, the court finds it unnecessary to address 
defendants' jurisdictional issues in their motion for 
partial summary judgment. Consequently, the court 
DENIES defendants' motion for partial summary 
judgment (# 61). All claims having been resolved, 
the court directs the Clerk's Office to close this case. 
SO ORDERED. 
D.Utah,2006. 
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ooOoo 
Wasatch County, a body politic 
of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and 
Cross-appellee, 
v. 
E. Ray Okelberry, Brian 
Qkelberry, Eric Okelberrv, 
Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources, West Daniels Land 
Association, and John Does 1-
25, 
Defendants, Appellees, 
and Cross-appellants. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20050389-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 30, 2 006) 
2006 UT App 473 
Fourth District, Heber Department, 010500388 
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre Jr. 
Attorneys: Thomas L. Low and Scott H. Sweat, Heber City, for 
Appellant and Cross-appellee 
Ryan D. Tenney, Provo, for Appellees and Cross-
appellants 
Before Judges Bench, McHugh, and Orme. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
ifl Wasatch County (Wasatch) appeals the trial court's ruling 
that principles of estoppel prevent it from exercising control 
over roads, located on land owned by West Daniels Land 
Association (the Association) and E. Ray Okelberry, Brian 
Okelberry, and Eric Okelberry (collectively, the Okelberrys), 1 
1. The Association owns property immediately adjacent to 
property owned by the Okelberrys. As members and shareholders in 
the Association, the Okelberrys used the Association's land in 
(continued...) 
that were adjudicated abandoned and dedicated to the public. The 
Okelberrys cross-appeal the trial court's determination that the 
roads were dedicated to the public under Utah Code section 72-5-
104(1). See. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001). We affirm in 
part and reverse and remand in part. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 In 195 7, the Okelberrys2 purchased a tract of rural, 
undeveloped property in Wasatch County. The property is criss-
1. ( ...continued) 
conjunction with their own for grazing livestock. The 
Association was initially included in the suit as a defendant. 
However, for reasons not clear from the record, it withdrew from 
the litigation. After the Association failed to appoint 
successor counsel, Wasatch sought default judgment against the 
Association. The Okelberrys opposed the motion and argued that 
as members of the Association they had the right to represent its 
interests at trial. The trial court did not directly enter a 
ruling on Wasatch's default judgment motion. Later, the court 
noted that default judgment had been entered against the 
Association in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
However, the trial court had allowed the Okelberrys to submit 
evidence with respect to the roads located on both the 
Okelberrys' and the Association's properties at trial. 
Additionally, the trial court adjudicated the status of the roads 
located on the Association's property, implicitly rejecting 
Wasatch's argument that the Okelberrys lacked standing to 
represent the Association's interests. See Zions First Nat. Bank 
v. C'Est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1980) (recognizing 
that trial courts implicitly deny motions where later judgment is 
in conflict with and fails to give effect to the motions). 
Because Wasatch has not appealed the issue of the Okelberrys' 
standing to represent the interests of the Association, this 
court addresses the merits without distinguishing between the 
Okelberrys' and the Association's properties. See Whitmer v. 
City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226, 228 n.l (Utah 1997) (declining to 
address issue not appealed). 
2. The tract was initially purchased by E. Ray Okelberry, his 
brother, Lee Okelberry, and their father, Roy Okelberry. 
Sometime after 1957, Ray and Lee Okelberry bought their father's 
interest in the property. And later, when Lee decided to retire, 
Ray's sons, Eric and Brian Okelberry, bought Lee's interest. At 
the present time, Ray, Eric, and Brian Okelberry own the property 
and continue to use it for their livestock operation. 
20050389-CA 2 
crossed by a series of unimproved dirt roads including the four 
roads at issue in this appeal: the Thorton Hollow Road, Ridge 
Line Road, Parker Canyon Road, and Circle Springs Road (the Four 
Roads) .3 The Four Roads begin and end at points outside the 
Okelberrys' property or are connected to roads that begin and end 
outside the property. At the time the property was purchased, it 
was bordered on the east and south by fences, separating the 
Okelberrys' property from United States Forest Service property. 
There were also multiple wire gates along the Four Roads such 
that persons traveling on the Four Roads generally had to open 
the gates before proceeding within the boundaries of the 
Okelberrys• property. 
%3 Sometime in 198 9, the Okelberrys started barring public use 
of the Four Roads by constantly locking the gates and posting no 
trespassing signs. In the mid-1990s, the Okelberrys placed their 
property into a Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit (CWMU) that 
allowed them to realize a profit from exclusive hunting 
activities on the property. In 2001, twelve years after the 
Okelberrys began permanently locking the gates, Wasatch initiated 
suit to have the Four Roads declared public highways under Utah 
Code section 72-5-104. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104.4 Under 
that provision, "[a] highway is dedicated and abandoned to the 
use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Id. § 72-5-104(1). 
1(4 After a three-day bench trial, the court entered findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. First, the court "specifically 
found that there was not public use of the [Four Roads] in the 
194 0s or before and also . . . no evidence of vehicular use prior 
to the 1950s." The court also specifically found that Wasatch 
had never performed any maintenance on the Four Roads. 
3. The initial suit included a fifth road, Maple Canyon Road, 
which the trial court determined had not been abandoned to the 
public. Because neither party appeals the trial court's decision 
with respect to Maple Canyon Road, it is not addressed here. 
4. An earlier version of this provision, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 27-12-89 (1995), was in effect at the time Wasatch claims 
dedication or abandonment of the Four Roads occurred. However, 
the current version, see id. § 72-5-104(1) (2001), is 
"substantively identical" to the earlier version. State v. Six 
Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104,14 n.3, 132 P.3d 687. Therefore, 
in the interests of convenience, all references and citations 
will be to the current version. See id. 
20050389-CA 3 
f5 Turning to the evidence and testimony presented at trial, 
the court noted that Wasatch had presented witnesses, members of 
the general public, who testified that for different periods of 
time between 1957 and 1989 they freely used the Four Roads. The 
court noted that the Okelberrys' witnesses alternatively 
testified that beginning in the 1960s, the gates on the Four 
Roads were generally kept closed and "periodically locked for 
several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the 
gates and property which stated 'No Trespassing--Private 
Property.'" Additionally, employees of the Okelberrys testified 
that they had, at times, asked people trespassing on the property 
or the roads to leave. After weighing the evidence, the court 
assumed the truth of the Okelberrys1 factual assertions and 
nonetheless determined that it was "clear that individuals using 
the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or 
early 1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the 
roads freely, and though not constantly, they used the roads 
continuously as they needed." 
16 The court also found that the majority of users were members 
of the general public, traveling without permission, and 
therefore used the Four Roads as a public thoroughfare. Finally, 
without defining exactly which ten years the Four Roads were used 
continuously as public thoroughfares, the court determined that 
between 1960 and 1990, public use "continued for at least ten 
years, if not much longer, or for multiple periods of ten years." 
Thus, the court concluded that the Four Roads had been dedicated 
to public use "well over ten years prior to 1989 when the 
Okelberrys began [permanently] locking the gates." 
%7 Although determining that the roads had been abandoned and 
dedicated to the public, the court found that Wasatch was 
equitably estopped from enforcing the dedication on behalf of the 
public. The court supported the estoppel determination with two 
findings. First, that "for a period of twelve years [the 
Okelberrys] exerted control and used the roads in an openly 
hostile manner to the public use of the streets." And second, 
although "little improvements have been made to the roads 
themselves," the Okelberrys had expended "large amounts of time 
and money" on their sheep and cattle operations as well as 
cultivated their business relationship with the CWMU. Wasatch 
appeals the trial court's judgment that it is equitably estopped 
from opening the Four Roads to public use, and the Okelberrys 
cross-appeal the trial court's ruling that the Four Roads are 
public roads by dedication. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
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f8 The Okelberrys challenge the trial court's determination 
that the Four Roads were abandoned and dedicated to the public 
under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104(1). "The trial court's ultimate conclusion that the facts of 
this case either satisfy or do not satisfy the requirements of 
section 72-5-104(1) is a mixed question of fact and law, which we 
review for correctness." State v. Six Mile Ranch Co.. 2006 UT 
App 104,1(9, 132 P.3d 687 (citing Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 
P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997)). However, because the legal 
requirements of a public highway determination under section 72-
5-104(1) are "highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous," we 
"give[] trial courts a fair degree of latitude in determining the 
legal consequences . . . of facts found by the court." Id. 
(quotations and citation omitted); accord Heber City Corp., 942 
P.2d at 309-10. "'Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's 
decision regarding whether a public highway has been established 
under section f72-5-104 (1)1 , we review the decision for 
correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its 
application of the facts to the statute . ' " Six Mile Ranch Co. , 
2006 UT App 104 at %9 (alteration in original) (quoting Heber 
City Corp.. 942 P.2d at 310). 
%9 The Okelberrys also challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence, arguing that Wasatch has not provided clear and 
convincing evidence of continuous use as a public thoroughfare. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). "To establish the dedication 
of a public road, we require clear and convincing evidence." 
AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168,17, 112 P.3d 1228 
(citing Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 639 
(1972)). Where a party challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence, "[a]n appellate court must launch any review of factual 
findings from rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
its clearly erroneous test . . . ." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54,1^28-
29, 561 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (quotations omitted) ; see also Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact . . . shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses."). Although it is appropriate for a "reviewing court 
to consider the standard of proof the prevailing party below was 
required to meet," the trial court's findings of fact will only 
be reversed under the clearly erroneous standard embodied in rule 
52(a) where a review of the record as a whole demonstrates the 
result is "against the clear weight of the evidence or leave[s] 
the appellate court with a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54 at 140; see also 
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle 
Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). 
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tlO Alternatively, Wasatch argues that the trial court erred 
when it applied equitable estoppel to bar its future attempts to 
open the Four Roads to public use. "[W]hether the trial court 
committed reversible error in applying the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel" to a public road determination is a question of law, 
which is "reviewed for correctness without any special 
deference." Western Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1377-78. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Dedication to the Public 
Kll Under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1), "[a] highway is 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten 
years." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). Thus, for a road to 
become a public highway under the statute, three elements must be 
met, "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public 
thoroughfare, (iii) for a period of ten years." Heber City 
Corp., 942 P.2d at 310, quoted in Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 
104 at 111. 
\\2 The Okelberrys argue that the trial court's findings of fact 
were not supported by clear and convincing evidence; therefore, 
its conclusions that the Four Roads had been used continuously as 
public thoroughfares were in error. We will address each of 
these elements in turn, noting, however, that although each 
element "embodies a logically distinct requirement that must be 
satisfied, the elements are so intertwined that they are not 
readily susceptible to separate discussion." Id. at 310 n.6. 
A. Continuous Use 
113 Under Utah law, continuous use of a road exists when "'the 
public, even though not consisting of a great many persons, made 
a continuous and uninterrupted use1 not necessarily every day, 
but 'as often as they found it convenient or necessary.1" AWINC 
Corp., 2005 UT App 168 at \ \ \ (quoting Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 
395, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (1958)). It is not required that public 
use be constant, rather it need only to have "'occurred as often 
as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. . . . Mere 
intermission is not interruption.'" Id. (omission in original) 
(quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 
1977) ) . 
114 The Okelberrys argue that the evidence of continuous use of 
the Four Roads was not clear and convincing because, at trial, 
they presented unrebutted evidence showing that the Okelberrys 
had expelled persons who lacked permission to use the roads and 
controlled access to the roads through closed gates that were 
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periodically locked. At the heart of the Okelberrys1 argument is 
the proposition that uncontested evidence of a closed or locked 
gate across a road, or a single instance where a party is ejected 
from the road, is an interruptive event sufficient to defeat any 
claim of continuous use by the public as a matter of law. While 
acknowledging the ease of application of such a bright-line test, 
we disagree. 
Hl5 In making public road determinations, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that "all of the facts should be considered together, 
and where there is dispute about whether a public use is 
established, determination of the facts and resolution of the 
issue is primarily the responsibility of the trial court." 
Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966) 
(emphasis added). Prior cases have recognized that the presence 
of gates, including the frequencies with which they are closed or 
locked, is a factor to be weighed heavily in making the 
continuous use determination. See, e.g., Campbell v. Box Elder 
County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (taking into 
account that road had been "generally barred by a locked gate," 
as well as testimony that the public "had been unable to use the 
road because of the gate"). Nonetheless, the presence of 
obstructions or gates, open or closed, unlocked or locked, has 
been treated as only one of the many factors a trial court may 
consider when determining if the public use was continuous. See 
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981) (affirming trial 
court's determination of public road despite finding that road 
was "periodically block[ed]" during the relevant time). Indeed, 
the Utah Supreme Court has declined opportunities to rely solely 
on the presence of a gate, locked or unlocked, to affirm trial 
courts' determinations that roads have not been dedicated to the 
public. See Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 
640-41 (1972) (weighing presence of gates, locked and unlocked, 
along with signage, lack of governmental maintenance, nature of 
use, and character of users in finding road was not abandoned); 
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426, 427 (1964) 
(relying on evidence of gates, as well as signs, grants of 
permission, past litigation initiated by the property owners 
alleging private road, and contracts for exclusive use); cf. 
Wilhelm v. Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., 2001 UT App 285U, No. 
20000559-CA, 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 131, at *3-*4 (Oct. 4, 2001) 
(per curiam) (noting that the owners had blocked access to the 
road several times but also weighing character of users and 
nature of use); Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (examining evidence of 
locked gate and testimony by members of the public who had been 
unable to use the road because of the gate). While we leave open 
the possibility that evidence that a road was blocked by a locked 
gate may weigh heavily enough, given the other facts and 
circumstances, to be dispositive of the question of continuous 
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use, we do not accept the Okelberrys1 argument that any evidence 
of a locked gate, no matter how brief, is conclusive evidence of 
interrupted use. 
fl6 Strong policy considerations underlie public highway 
determinations governed by Utah Code section 72-5-104. Utah 
appellate courts have noted that because "the ownership of 
property should be granted a high degree of sanctity and 
respect," Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 
1995), "dedication of property to public use should not be 
lightly presumed," Thurman, 626 P.2d at 448. In consideration of 
this policy, the Utah Supreme Court has placed the burden of 
proving the existence of a public road by clear and convincing 
evidence on the party seeking the dedication. See Draper City, 
888 P.2d at 1099 ("This higher standard of proof is demanded 
since the ownership of property should be granted a high degree 
of sanctity and respect."). 
fl7 However, adopting the test urged by the Okelberrys would 
disrupt the delicate balance embodied in the clear and convincing 
standard. If a property owner was able to defeat a dedication 
claim by simply providing self-serving testimony that at some 
point she interrupted use of a road by locking a gate for a 
single short period of time within a ten-year period or ejecting 
a single person from the road, the dedication statute would be 
eviscerated. Cf. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 
545, 546-47 (1968) (reversing trial court's determination of 
dedication where evidence was almost exclusively provided by 
self-serving witnesses "having their own special and private 
interests in the road"); Bonner, 417 P.2d at 648 ("Resolution of 
[a dedication] issue cannot rest entirely upon what the owner 
says was his intent. In case controversy arises he can always 
avow that his intent was in accord with his interest." (footnote 
omitted)). At the same time, we note the difficulty property 
owners face in locating disinterested witnesses to testify that 
they were prevented from using the roads at their convenience or 
the time of their choosing because they met with a locked gate or 
were turned away.5 It is precisely for these reasons that a 
trial court is given great latitude in weighing the facts in 
light of the credibility and motivation of witnesses when 
determining if use of a road by the public was continuous. See 
Petersen, 438 P.2d at 549 (Crockett, C.J., dissenting) (noting 
5. These failed attempts to use the road may be unknown to the 
property owners. Even in cases where the property owner ejected 
a member of the public, he is unlikely to retain identification 
or contact information that could be used to subpoena the member 
of the public for trial. 
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that "it is the prerogative of the trial judge to determine 
whether the tests [for dedication] have been met" including a 
weighing of interested witness's testimony). 
fl8 Thus, the question of continuous use should be approached as 
a multi-faceted inquiry that requires a trial court to weigh all 
the evidence presented in light of the credibility of witnesses. 
We recognize that evidence of gates, and in particular locked 
gates, during the relevant period is strong evidence of 
interrupted use. See, e.g., Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (noting 
that trial court's determination that there was not continuous 
use was permissibly premised on finding that road was "generally 
barred by a locked gate"); Cox v. Coxf 373 P.2d 929, 933 (Idaho 
1962) ("Where gates are in existence across a road barring the 
passage and making it necessary to open them in order to use the 
road, the existence of such gates is considered as strong 
evidence that the road was not a public road.")/ cf. Thomson, 493 
P. 2d at 640-41 (discussing gates, chains, and padlocks across 
road in affirming trial court's determination that dedication had 
not occurred). Nonetheless, in some instances, evidence of a 
gate, even a locked gate, may not weigh heavily enough to 
establish that there was an interruption of continuous use. See, 
e.g., Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444,1112-15 (affirming 
trial court's determination of dedication even where property 
owners presented evidence that gate across road had at one time 
been locked). In deciding whether a locked gate acted as an 
interruptive force sufficient to restart the running of the 
statutory ten-year period, the trial court should weigh the 
evidence regarding the duration and frequency that the gate was 
locked against the frequency and volume of public use to 
determine if there is clear and convincing evidence that public 
use of the road was continuous. 
119 In this case, the trial court balanced the frequency and 
duration that the gates were locked against the frequency and 
volume of public use. The trial court found that even were it to 
accept as true "that beginning in the 1960s the gates were 
periodically locked for several days at a time," it was 
nonetheless "clear that individuals using the roads beginning in 
the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s used the roads 
without interruption, . . . and though not constantly, they used 
the roads continuously as they needed." 
120 The trial court's conclusion is supported in the record. 
Several witnesses testified that they used the Four Roads during 
the relevant period and were never asked to leave and never 
encountered a locked gate. " [W]e do not set aside the trial 
court's factual findings unless they are against the clear weight 
of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and firm 
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conviction that a mistake has been made." Western Kane County 
Special Serv. Dist, No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co. , 744 P.2d 1376, 
1377 (Utah 1987). No such conviction is held here. Clear and 
convincing evidence may be premised on " [t]he testimony of one 
credible witness[] if believed by the court or jury." Bonner v. 
Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966). Here, the 
trial court may have relied on any one of many witnesses. We do 
not, therefore, disturb the trial court's conclusion that there 
was continuous use. 
B. Public Thoroughfare 
1|21 Three general requirements must be met to demonstrate that 
the road at issue was used as a public thoroughfare: "(i) 
[t]here must be passing or travel, (ii) the use must be by the 
public, [and] (iii) use by permission does not constitute use as 
a public thoroughfare." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 
307, 311 (Utah 1997) (quotations omitted). The Okelberrys do not 
challenge the trial court's findings that there was passing or 
travel nor do they challenge that the travel was engaged in by 
members of the public. Rather, the Okelberrys assert that it was 
error for the trial court to find that there was clear and 
convincing evidence of use as a public thoroughfare because they 
presented uncontested evidence that gates were maintained on the 
Four Roads throughout the relevant period. More simply, the 
Okelberrys argue that the mere presence of a gate, locked or 
unlocked, is conclusive proof of permissive use and therefore 
may, as a single inquiry, defeat a finding of public 
thoroughfare. This court has rejected such a construction of 
Utah law. 
i|22 "It is firmly established under Utah law that permissive 
use cannot result in either adverse possession or dedication of 
private property to the public." Campbell v. Box Elder County, 
962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Heber City Corp. , 
942 P.2d at 311-12; Thurman v. Bvram, 626 P.2d 447, 449-50 (Utah 
1981)). In Campbell v. Box Elder County, we recognized that a 
property owner's use of a gate was strong evidence, but not 
conclusive proof, of permissive use. See 962 P.2d at 809. 
There, we affirmed the trial court's determination that use was 
permissive where it was supported by evidence showing "the 
Campbells had unlocked the gate every year except 1994 for deer 
hunting season and had relocked it at the end of each hunting 
season." Id. However, we have since clarified the treatment of 
gates in Campbell by explaining that it is not the presence of 
the gate, alone, that indicates permissive use. See State v. Six 
Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104,123, 132 P.3d 687. Instead, 
Campbell stood "for the proposition that an overt act, such as 
locking and unlocking a gate, provides evidence of permissive 
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use." Id. While the overt act of locking and unlocking the gate 
under the facts and circumstances in Campbell was an indication 
of permissive use, the erection of a gate by a property owner 
does not conclusively establish the character of the public use 
as permissive because a gate "may be erected for purposes other 
than obstruction of public travel." Mclntyre v. Board of County 
Commf rs, 86 P.3d 402, 409-10 (Colo. 2004) (quotations and 
citation omitted). For example, because a gate may be erected 
across a public road for the purpose of controlling livestock, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106 (2001), gates across roads do not 
always carry an inference of permissive use. See, e.g., Lemont 
Land Corp. v. Rogers, 887 P.2d 724, 728 (Mont. 1994) (noting that 
where "the gate was used to control livestock, not travel," it 
was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion of permissive 
use) . 
[^23 Therefore, !f[w]hile evidence of a fence or gate on the road 
gives rise to a strong indication that any public use of the road 
is permissive, their existence does not provide the landowner 
with a conclusive presumption that the use is permissive." 
Mclntyre, 86 P.3d at 412; see also Tomlin Enters., Inc. v. 
Althoff, 2004 MT 383,fl9, 103 P.3d 1069 ("[T]he fact that the 
passage of a road has been for years barred by gates or other 
obstructions to be opened and closed by the parties passing over 
the land, has always been considered as strong evidence in 
support of a mere license to the public . . . ." (quotations and 
citation omitted)). Instead, trial courts are given wide 
latitude to determine if use is permissive because the "legal 
requirements [of section 72-5-104], other than the ten-year 
requirement, are highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous." 
Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 310. 
f24 The Utah Supreme Court has warned that in public road 
dedication cases, appellate courts should not attempt to 
"establish a coherent and consistent statement of the law on a 
fact-intensive, case-by-case review of trial court rulings." Id. 
Thus, under Utah law, trial courts are "permitted some reign to 
grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a 
. . . [public thoroughfare] determination." Kohler v. Martin, 
916 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration and omission 
in original) (quotations and citation omitted). Because the 
trial court has significant discretion to weigh the myriad facts 
that provide evidence of non-permissive use, the trial court's 
determination that travel on the Four Roads was without 
permission is adequately supported by the record as is its 
determination that the Four Roads were used as public 
thoroughfares. Several witnesses testified to using the Four 
Roads for decades without seeking or obtaining permission and 
without encountering locked gates. Additionally, testimony from 
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government. See Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595, 597 (Utah 
1974). 
f27 There is no dispute that the Four Roads have not been 
abandoned or vacated by order under section 72-5-105(1). Despite 
the requirements of that section, "there may be circumstances so 
extreme that" the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied 
against the government "to prevent the assertion of rights in a 
public highway." Western Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1378. 
However, to remain "in harmony with the expressed will of the 
legislature, which requires that a strict statutory procedure be 
followed for the vacation of a public road," courts should be 
"extremely reluctant to apply the doctrine of estoppel against 
the assertion of rights in a public highway by a government 
entity." Id. 
i[2 8 To prevail on their claim of equitable estoppel, the 
Okelberrys were required to show three elements: 
(1) an admission, statement, or act 
inconsistent with the claim afterward 
asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of 
such admission, statement, or act, and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from 
allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such admission, statement, or act. 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689, 694 
(Utah 1979) . Additionally, when estoppel is asserted against the 
government, the admission, statement, or act relied upon must 
amount to a "very clear, well-substantiated representation[] by 
[the] government entit[y]." Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 
P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992). More specifically, in public roads 
cases, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the admission, 
statement, or act by the government must be an affirmative 
representation. See Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 
766, 769 (1917) (noting that case was uncommon and suitable for 
the application of estoppel because "the municipality by its own 
affirmative acts, declarations, and conduct, misled the [property 
owner]" (emphasis added)). 
12 9 The Okelberrys argue that Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112 
Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947), set out a special test for 
estoppel against the government in public roads cases whereby 
estoppel may be premised on the government's acquiescence in the 
private party asserting exclusive control over the roads. We 
disagree. The Okelberrys rely on the language in Premium Oil 
that states: 
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[W]here the public have long withheld the 
assertion of control over streets, and 
private parties have been . . . induced to 
believe the streets abandoned by the public, 
. . . with the acquiescence of those 
representing the public . . . the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel may be applied. 
Id. at 204 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). However, any 
exception created by Premium Oil allowing the assertion of 
estoppel against the government in public roads cases, where 
reliance is premised on government inaction or acquiescence, was 
abrogated by subsequent legislation and case law. Cf. Western 
Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1378 ("We are extremely reluctant to 
apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in 
a public highway by a government entity. This reluctance is in 
harmony with the expressed will of the legislature, which 
requires that a strict statutory procedure be followed for the 
vacation of a public road." (citation omitted)). 
f30 At the time Premium Oil was decided in 1947, the law 
governing abandonment of a public road was found in Utah Code 
section 36-1-3 and stated: "All highways once established must 
continue to be highways until abandoned by order of . . . 
competent authority." Utah Code Ann. § 36-1-3 (1943) (emphasis 
added). Thus, the statute only required that the highway be 
"abandoned," and it may have been possible for a private property 
owner to reasonably rely on the governments "abandonment" or 
acquiescence in private control as an element of an estoppel 
claim. See Premium Oil, 187 P.2d at 204. However, in 1963, the 
Utah Legislature amended the language of section 36-1-36 by 
enactment of Utah Code section 27-12-90, which stated: "All 
public highways once established shall continue to be highways 
until abandoned or vacated by order of . . . competent 
authority." Act of 1963, ch. 39, § 90, 1963 Utah Laws 114, 141; 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90 (1969) (emphasis added). In addition 
to the "abandoned or vacated" language of the 1963 amendment, the 
highway code was also amended in 1965, creating a strict 
statutory procedure for "abandon ting] or vacat[ing]" a public 
highway. See Act of 1965, ch. 52, §§ 1-5, 1965 Utah Laws 154, 
154-56; Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-102.1 to -102.5 (Supp. 1969). 
Decisions of the Utah Supreme Court following enactment of these 
statutory procedures make it clear that a public highway may only 
6. Utah Code section 36-1-3 was renumbered in 1953 to section 
27-1-3 without changing the language. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-1-
3 (1953) (amended 1963) . 
20050389-CA 14 
be abandoned or vacated when there has been strict statutory 
compliance. See Western Kane County, 744 P.2d at 1378; Henderson 
v. Osauthorpe, 657 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1982); Ercanbrack, 524 
P.2d at 597. 
1[31 Thus, under the modern statutes7 and case law, a private 
property owner would no longer be able to reasonably rely on the 
government's acquiescence in private control to establish a claim 
of estoppel. See Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 
v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987) 
("[E]stoppel should not be available to circumvent the statutory 
process."). Instead, a property owner can only claim reasonable 
reliance where the governmental entity has made some affirmative 
representation that it intended to abandon or vacate the road in 
compliance with the statutory procedure. To hold otherwise would 
come dangerously close to recognizing a form of adverse 
possession against the government whereby a private party could 
obtain equitable rights in a public road merely by exercising 
adverse control for a period of time. Utah law expressly 
prohibits any person from acquiring rights in a public road by 
adverse possession. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13 (2002) . 
f32 In this case, there was no evidence that Wasatch made any 
representation with respect to the Four Roads, let alone a 
representation that the statutory procedures had been or would be 
followed to abandon or vacate the Four Roads.8 Instead, the 
trial court based its estoppel determination on the fact that 
Wasatch acquiesced in the private control by "failing to bring an 
action for twelve years." Therefore, we reverse the trial 
court's judgment preventing Wasatch from enforcing the public's 
rights in the Four Roads.9 
7. Utah Code section 27-12-90 was renumbered in 1998 to section 
72-5-105(1) and remains substantively unchanged. See Act of 
1998, ch. 270, § 133, 1998 Utah Laws 806, 861; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-105 (Supp. 2005) . The current statutory procedure for 
abandoning or vacating a public road can be found at Utah Code 
section 72-3-108. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108 (2001). 
8. Because we hold that the Okelberrys have not met the first 
element of a claim for equitable estoppel, we need not address 
the remaining elements. 
9. Although our holding allows Wasatch to enforce the public's 
rights to access the Four Roads, nothing in this opinion should 
be read to suggest that the public has obtained any rights, 
hunting or otherwise, with respect to the Okelberrys' private 
(continued...) 
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CONCLUSION 
f33 We do not have a firm conviction that the trial court erred 
when it determined that the Four Roads were dedicated and 
abandoned to the public pursuant to Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) 
after having been continuously used as public thoroughfares for a 
period of at least ten years. We also conclude that it was 
reversible error for the trial court to apply the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel against Wasatch's attempts to enforce the 
public's rights to use the Four Roads. We therefore affirm in 
part and reverse and remand in part for entry of judgment 
consistent with this decision. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
H34 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
9. (...continued) 
property abutting the roads. On the contrary, members of the 
public are only free to travel over the Four Roads and have no 
rights, absent permission from the Okelberrys, to enter onto 
their land, which remains private. 
20050389-CA 16 
